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ABSTRACT
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Recent reliance on social media platforms as major sources of news and infor-
mation, both for journalists and the larger population and especially during times of
crisis, motivate the need for better methods of identifying and tracking high-impact
events in these social media streams. Social media’s volume, velocity, and democrati-
zation of information (leading to limited quality controls) complicate rapid discovery
of these events and one’s ability to trust the content posted about these events. This
dissertation addresses these complications in four stages, using Twitter as a model
social platform. The first stage analyzes Twitter’s response to major crises, specif-
ically terrorist attacks in Western countries, showing these high-impact events do
not significantly impact message or user volume. Instead, these events drive changes
in Twitter’s topic distribution, with conversation, retweets, and hashtags relevant
to these events experiencing significant, rapid, and short-lived bursts in frequency.
Furthermore, conversation participants tend to prefer information from local author-
ities/organizations/media over national or international sources, with accounts for
local police or local newspapers often emerging as central in the networks of inter-
action. Building on these results, the second stage in this dissertation presents and
evaluates a set of features that capture these topical bursts associated with crises
by modeling bursts in frequency for individual tokens in the Twitter stream. The
resulting streaming algorithm is capable of discovering notable moments across a
series of major sports competitions using Twitter’s public stream without relying on
domain- or language-specific information or models. Furthermore, results demon-
strate models trained on sporting competition data perform well when transferred
to earthquake identification. This streaming algorithm is then extended in this dis-
sertation’s third stage to support real-time event tracking and summarization. This
real-time algorithm leverages new distributed processing technology to operate at
scale and is evaluated against a collection of other community-developed information
retrieval systems, where it performs comparably. Further experiments also show this
real-time burst detection algorithm can be integrated with these other information
retrieval systems to increase overall performance. The final stage then investigates
automated methods for evaluating credibility in social media streams by leveraging
two existing data sets. These two data sets measure different types of credibility
(veracity versus perception), and results show veracity is negatively correlated with
the amount of disagreement in and length of a conversation, and perceptions of
credibility are influenced by the amount of links to other pages, shared media about
the event, and the number of verified users participating in the discussion. Contri-
butions made across these four stages are then usable in the relatively new fields of
computational journalism and crisis informatics, which seek to improve news gather-
ing and crisis response by leveraging new technologies and data sources like machine
learning and social media.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Social media’s ubiquity has had a profound effect on the ways in which ordinary
people share experiences and information, from mundane photographs of last night’s
dinner to breaking news of earthquakes, terrorist attacks, and real-time coverage of
protests or mass demonstrations. While a significant portion of this content might
discuss today’s outfit or the pinnacle of Justin Bieber’s artistry, social media cover-
age of high-impact events like disasters and social unrest has become an important
resource for Internet users. Social media’s impact is evidenced not just by this
popularity though; entire nations have restricted or completely severed access to
platforms like Twitter as a means to control social unrest (as has occurred in both
Egypt and Turkey). Despite social media’s potential, it is difficult to identify these
high-impact events as they occur, follow new developments as events unfold, and
differentiate between credible and dubious content.
Events surrounding the Boston Marathon bombings in April of 2013 provide
a microcosmic view of social media’s potential for social good while simultaneously
hindering accurate news consumption through noise and the spread of rumorous
information. For social good, Cassa et al. showed a significant number of Twitter
messages, or tweets, posted immediately after the explosions contained valuable
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information on severity and location that could guide first responders [1]. A Pew
research study found nearly a quarter of all Americans (and more than half of
Americans between the ages of 18 and 29) followed coverage of the Boston Marathon
bombing on social media platforms like Twitter or Facebook [2]. The Boston Police
Department (BPD) was lauded for its use of Twitter to interact with this massive
audience “to keep the public informed about the status of the investigation, to
calm nerves and request assistance, to correct mistaken information reported by
the press, and to ask for public restraint in the tweeting of information from police
scanners” [3]. At the same time, the shear volume of social media activity made
it difficult to follow new developments, as celebrities, their hordes of followers, and
other outsiders shared their sympathies [4].
To make matters worse, no guarantees exist about the validity or truth of
information posted to social media, and a portion of the information concerning
the Boston Marathon bombing in both social and traditional media was incorrect,
ranging from the number of bombs found in Boston to whether suspects had been
arrested [5]. Even if one only consumed information from trusted social media
sources like the Associated Press (AP), event these highly-qualified sources may
report inaccurate information, as many examples in Boston showed. Furthermore,
two weeks after the Boston Marathon bombing, hackers compromised the AP’s
Twitter account and posted a message saying the White House had been attacked,
and the president was injured. Not only was this tweet shared by over 4,000 users,
automated financial systems that process Twitter data picked up the information
and caused a “flash crash” in financial markets, resulting in a loss of over one billion
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dollars in assets [6]. It is therefore dangerous to assume all (or even many) posts
on social media provide true and accurate information, and yet many users and
organizations have little recourse to verify this information and often take it as true.
The Boston Marathon bombing is also an outlier in this area in that many journalists
and media organizations were already present to cover the Boston Marathon; in
many cases, journalistic resources are not already present when a disaster strikes,
further complicating reliable coverage.
Given the rapid dissemination and democratization of information via social
networks and the growing population who rely on these sources for up-to-date news,
a clear need exists for methods that distill or extract newsworthy and credible in-
formation from social media streams. This dissertation presents research to address
these needs, covering social media’s response to high-impact events, algorithms for
streaming and real-time event detection/summarization, and methods for assessing
credibility in topical threads of social media messages. Therefore, research contained
herein shows:
By integrating machine learning and high-volume streams
from social media, one can detect high-impact events, describe




Researchers have tried to address these needs through a variety of approaches over
the past several decades, but social media’s volume, velocity, and limited account-
ability present a slew of advantages and unique challenges. For event detection,
researchers have either used retrospective systems that look into the past (of lim-
ited utility for up-to-date news) or have tracked predefined keyword frequencies.
While such systems are limited by the assumption that one can know the type, lo-
cation, or language of an event of interest a priori. Similarly, researchers have sought
to address credibility issues in social media by anchoring trust in journalists or ac-
counts with large numbers of followers [7–11], but many useful pieces of information
are posted by non-authoritative users [12]. Assessing credibility or trustworthiness
in or near real time, however, still represents a gap in the literature as many of these
efforts assume either known event information and/or retrospective analysis. Social
media content comes with a huge variety of features that could support credibility
analysis, and while some of these indicators may already have been explored in these
works, latitude exists for integrating machine learning techniques with features like
network structure and multimedia. These gaps combined with preliminary work
in streaming event detection and trust analysis suggest constructing systems for
detecting credible events rapidly is feasible.
Performing this research relies on access to large volumes of social media data,
and given the increasing value of this data to advertisers, other commercial entities,
and governments, such large data sets can be difficult to obtain. To this end, this
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work focuses primarily on the Twitter platform as a model system. While Twitter is
an order of magnitude smaller than the largest social media platform, i.e., Facebook,
Twitter is one of the most popular social media platforms, maintains a population
of over three hundred million monthly active users, and averages over four hundred
million posts per day [13]. Most importantly, however, Twitter provides access to
a 1%-sample stream of its data to developers for free, making it an appealing and
accessible data source.
With these goals and constraints in mind, this research makes the following
contributions:
Twitter Response to Terrorist Attacks in Western Countries
As a first step in developing methods for detecting high-impact events in Twitter,
one should understand how Twitter responds to these crises. Recent seminal work on
crisis informatics in social media investigates the distributions of various types and
sources of content following crises (e.g., messages about sympathy, advice/caution,
affected individuals, or donations posted by eyewitnesses, government organizations,
or media) [4]. Twitter’s structural and behavioral responses to these events remains
an open question, however, with limited research into Twitter activities like post-
ing, sharing, or following and behaviors like use of hashtags, mentions, and sharing
media. This dissertation clarifies these uncertainties through the following contri-
butions:
• Analyzing structural and behavioral responses to terrorist attacks in the gen-
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eral Twitter population,
• Comparing Twitter’s general response with changes in Twitter activity rel-
evant to the target event (i.e., activity across all of Twitter versus activity
mentioning the target event), and
• Identifying trends in Twitter accounts that emerge as central in the social
network activity surrounding these events.
Language- and Domain-Agnostic Event Discovery in Social Media
Streams
Many research efforts into identifying events in social media presuppose knowledge
of event types and other relevant information. For example, if one wanted to track
soccer goals in the FIFA World Cup via social media, the typical approach is to
track frequencies of a known keyword like “goal” [14]. Such methods work but are
inflexible in that they only detect events described by the human-generated seed
keywords, a limitation with three important consequences: 1) The system yields
limited insight into event context (e.g., who scored the goal or where an event
occurred) as event-specific contextual keywords are often omitted from the keyword
list to ensure generalizability. 2) Such systems miss unanticipated events because
the human responsible for seed keywords did not know to include relevant keywords.
3) Lastly, these approaches miss events or information conveyed in languages other
than those in the keyword set, implicitly restricting event detection to only those
languages represented in the seed list. Research introduced in this work addresses
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these consequences with three contributions:
• Introducing a streaming algorithm, called LABurst, and feature set for discov-
ering and describing key moments in Twitter’s public sample stream without
requiring manually defined keywords,
• Evaluating LABurst’s performance against a pair of baselines, and
• Demonstrating event detection models trained on sporting events are trans-
ferable to disaster response with a case study on identifying earthquakes.
Implementation for Real-Time Event Detection
Of the solutions for detecting events in social media, few are designed to process
data streams, even fewer attempt this detection in real time, and of these real-time
systems, many suffer from the same domain-specific weaknesses discussed above. To
cover this gap in the literature, this work contributes:
• An extension of LABurst, called RTTBurst, to the real-time context,
• The design and implementation of an end-to-end system for ingesting descrip-
tions of user interests and discovering new and relevant tweets using a simple
model for identifying bursts in token usage, and
• A set of experiments that integrate this real-time language- and domain-
agnostic method with classical information retrieval systems.
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Algorithms for Evaluating Social Media Credibility in Near Real Time
As mentioned, it is highly plausible that data taken from social media could be
false, misleading, or actively malicious. While research has attempted to assess this
lack of credibility in social media, few solutions exist for evaluation in the streaming
context. This work extends credibility analysis for social media with the following
contributions:
• Leveraging two data sets of credibility and rumor in social media to construct
models that can differentiate between credible and non-credible threads of
Twitter conversation, and
• An analysis of features for automatically differentiating between credible and
non-credible events across multiple data sets.
1.2 Dissertation Roadmap
This dissertation’s principal goal is to support a system for identifying and describing
high-impact events in social media and assessing their credibility in real time. To
that end, this work is constructed in sequential layers, each of which moves closer
to this goal.
Chapter 2 establishes the foundations of this work with a discussion of related
and prior research into event detection and its applications to social media. Special
interest is paid to social media as it pertains to crises (both natural and man-made).
The chapter ends with an overview of current and ongoing research into credibility
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analysis and rumor detection on Twitter.
Chapter 3 then explores the structural and behavioral responses on Twitter
to a collection of terror events in countries with high densities of Twitter users: the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing in the United States, the 2014 Sydney Hostage Cri-
sis in Australia, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo Shooting and November 2015 Paris attacks
in France, and the March 2016 Brussels transit attacks in Belgium. Results in this
chapter show, while these events do not significantly impact general Twitter usage,
those users who are discussing the event behave in predictable ways across events.
These results inform research into crisis-level event detection by identifying poten-
tial signals of a crisis-level event and demonstrating the need for event detection
mechanisms that operate at the topical level.
Chapter 4 builds on the prior chapter’s results and develops LABurst, an
algorithm for detecting and describing high-impact, crisis-level events in social media
streams based on changes in individual token frequency. Owing to the relative rarity
of crisis events, this chapter starts by identifying high-impact moments across three
major sporting competitions: the 2013 World Series, the 2014 Super Bowl, and
the 2014 World Cup. This task includes a set of features one can use to identify
these events and evaluates the power of each feature. Results then show LABurst
outperforms a time series analysis baseline and is competitive with a domain-specific
baseline despite LABurst lacking any domain knowledge. These outcomes are then
connected back to crisis informatics by transferring LABurst’s models learned in the
sports domain to the task of identifying earthquakes in Japan.
A direct extension of LABurst, called RTTBurst, is then presented in Chap-
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ter 5, which leverages LABurst’s results and a subset of features to identify novel
and topical events in real time. This chapter focuses on the implementation of an
end-to-end system for real-time topic tracking using burst detection and distributed
computing platforms. Evaluation results in a large-scale competition on real-time
tracking and summarization in Twitter are then presented to demonstrate this ap-
proach’s potential. Chapter 5 closes with an experiment integrating this real-time
language- and domain-agnostic method with classical information retrieval systems,
showing RTTBurst’s burst detection generally increases performance.
Once these mechanisms are established for real-time event detection, research
direction shifts in chapter 6 to establishing credibility in this data. To this end,
Chapter 6 explores two data sets on credibility in Twitter, one that captures journalist-
backed veracity and the other capturing crowd-sourced perceptions of credibility.
Results show veracity is negatively correlated with the amount of disagreement in
and length of a conversation, and perceptions of credibility are influenced by the
amount of links to other pages, shared media about the event, and the number of
verified users participating in the discussion. Differences in these two types of cred-
ibility prevent models trained on one data set from performing well when applied
to the other. Despite such differences, one can build classifiers with these features
to differentiate between credible and non-credible events for each data set.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with an overview of results, a
discussion of their utility to the larger field, and early efforts and ideas for future
work. Taken together, the research and results described in this dissertation pro-
vide a foundation for deeper exploration into social media’s use as a reliable and
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up-to-date source of information. With the beginnings of an implemented system
already developed and tested, future work can expand on these results to develop
support tools for journalists, first-responders, and consumers in areas under-served
by traditional media platforms or in areas rife with political conflict and propaganda.
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Chapter 2: Relevant Work on Social Media Analysis
Since Milgram’s work on the value of weak social ties, researchers have increasingly
studied social networks, their evolution, and what they can reveal about society and
human behavior [15]. As electronic communities emerged with Usenet and online
bulletin board systems in the late 1970s/early 1980s and chatrooms in the 1990s,
scholars gained a new perspective from which to analyze these social networks di-
rectly. With the introduction of social media following the Internet’s proliferation
and early blogging platforms in the 2000s, the volume and velocity of social net-
works and media data grew rapidly. Today, social media platforms like Facebook
and Twitter boast monthly user populations rivaling the size of countries, with Face-
book connecting over 1.6 billion monthly active users alone in 2016 (larger than the
population of China) [13].
Researchers have shown great interest in these massive and rapidly expand-
ing data sets, with new research about insights garnered from such data published
constantly. The democratization of information platforms like Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube and others is supporting new and powerful uses across a range of top-
ics. Research has shown correlations between sentiment on Twitter and fluctuations
in major stock markets, leading the financial industry to leverage social networks
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in buying and selling stocks and other assets [16]. In 2010, Sakaki et al. demon-
strated Twitter could be used as an early warning system for earthquakes in Japan.
Users shared news of earthquakes on Twitter almost instantaneously, and the radio
waves containing this information propagated through wires faster than earthquakes
propagated through the Earth’s crust [17]. Other research has tracked evolutions
in social movements and activism using social media [18–20], and more still have
explored social media as a news source [21–24].
This dissertation builds on this foundation of social media analysis, with this
chapter focusing on the most relevant research areas. First, this chapter discusses
social media’s use during and after disasters (both natural and man-made) in the
recent field of crisis informatics. These disaster scenarios provide use cases for event
and news detection in social media, leading this chapter into a discussion of event
detection on the Internet and in social media.
Until the past few years, much of this research was retrospective (e.g., iden-
tifying newsworthy events over the past few days, weeks, or months) or dealt with
small data sets, but as data generated by social media grew, near real-time event
detection became more interesting and feasible. At the same time, the large size of
social media data necessitated new methods to analyze at scale and perform these
real-time event/news detection tasks, which this chapter covers as well. As moti-
vated in Chapter 1, however, real-time event detection is only part of the problem:
social media coverage of these events has little guarantee of veracity and is riddled
with rumor. This chapter therefore closes with a review of recent research into issues
of rumor detection and veracity in social media.
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2.1 Social Media, Terrorism, and Crisis Informatics
A great deal of research has explored the role of social media, especially Twitter,
in disaster response and critical information communication [25–28]. Much of the
initial work on Twitter and crisis informatics focused on natural disasters, with
examples like early work by Hughes and Palen on Twitter and emergency events
[29]. This research demonstrated Twitter populations responded to these events by
sharing more links to other web pages and fewer “person-specific reply tweets” [29].
Hughes and Palen acknowledged Twitter behaviors grow and evolve over time, and
that these patterns may change. Despite these uncertainties, Hughes and Palen
claimed emergency management organizations could leverage these resources for
public communication, and government agencies have been performing their own
investigations into this potential use [30].
Effective communication is important for managing any crisis response but is
especially important during terrorist attacks, where the panic and fear that comes
from poor communication is part of the attacker’s objective. Analyses into Twitter
use as it relates to terror attacks emerged as a research topic in 2011 when Oh,
Agrawal, and Rao discussed ways in which terrorists in Mumbai in 2008 used infor-
mation posted to Twitter to increase their effectiveness [31]. There results showed
tweets contained informative situational awareness content often available on Twit-
ter before major media networks. Similarly, Sullivan’s 2014 paper also showed ter-
rorists and sympathizers used social networks like Twitter to amplify their message
and reshape the narrative surrounding the events [32].
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These results suggest social networks like Twitter can disseminate information
faster than governments or major news networks, making them valuable resources
during crisis response [31]. At the same time, however, Twitter users are especially
anxious and more prone to accept and transmit rumors during crises, and especially
during about terrorist attacks [33,34]. While dangers do exist in unrestricted social
media streams that cover terror attacks [31,32], works by Gupta and Kumaraguru,
Faustino et al., Vieweg et al, and Olteanu et al. have all shown social media contains
important and useful information about these events. This information can enhance
public understanding and situational awareness of the event while also calming and
supporting those affected [4, 12, 27]. Recent work by Olteanu et al. revealed the
majority of content shared during 26 crises in 2012-2013 came from traditional media
sources and contained (in order of prevalence) useful information, information about
people affected by the crisis, and expressions of sympathy and emotional support [4].
While this work provided unique insights into the sources and types of content
shared in response to these unexpected events, open questions remain concerning
Twitter’s structural and behavioral responses; e.g., it is unknown whether these
events drive more users to social media and affect post or retweet frequency. Work
in this dissertation builds upon these foundation by investigating these responses to
a specific type of event (terror attacks) in a specific context (industrialized, Western
countries). While others have explored social media and terror, this effort extends
the state of the art by generalizing across a set of terror events.
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2.2 Event Detection
Detecting events by leveraging digital media has fascinated researchers for over
twenty years, with new methods, breakthroughs, and technologies emerging every
few years. This subfield has evolved to integrate the latest available techniques and
data sources, starting from early digital newsprint to blogs and now social media.
Early stages of this research started in the mid-nineties with the Topic Detection
and Tracking (TDT) initiative. These programs demonstrated feasibility in detect-
ing new topics from traditional media sources, but as Allan, Papka, and Lavrenko
discussed in 1998, these approaches required additional work to see real success [35].
Even in that early work, Allan et al. were already discussing the tradeoffs of using
pre-defined keyword sets and event classes when detecting new events, an issue re-
searchers are still addressing today. It is also important to note that, at this nascent
stage, topic detection and event detection were relatively synonymous.
Though this early research focused primarily on topic detection from newsprint
and traditional media sources, work by Kleinberg in 2002 altered the landscape by
applying topic detection to non-traditional data sources like personal email archives
and by introducing one of the first real treatments of burst analysis in “document
streams that arrive continuously over time” rather than static collections [36]. De-
spite introducing the streaming context, Kleinberg cast topic detection as a ret-
rospective, state-based optimization problem. Kleinberg then leveraged hidden
Markov models to find sequences of high usage keywords, or bursts, from which
he could detect events (and construct complex nested states to develop event hier-
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archies). Kleinberg’s examination laid the foundation for research into topic bursts
that characterized much of the proceeding work in this area.
Following from Kleinberg’s work and the increasing size of digital content on
the Internet, several new approaches to topic detection emerged. Notably, topic
detection divided into two distinct tasks: identifying topics in data via algorithms
like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [37] and detecting events from text. Research
in this dissertation focuses on events rather than topics, so early event detection
work like that from Fung et al. in 2005 is especially interesting [38]. Fung et al.
extended Kleinberg’s burst detection scheme by identifying bursty keywords from
digital newspapers and clustering these keywords into groups to identify bursty
events, which displayed success in identifying trending events in an English-language
newspaper from Hong Kong.
Along with new interest in burst-centric research, scientists also began explor-
ing additional data sources beyond traditional newsprint, especially blog content.
Blogs offered direct insight into the social consciousness in a way previously un-
available via traditional media since blogs include a great deal of social information
regarding the author. Zhao et al. took advantage of this additional social informa-
tion in their 2007 work on flow-based event detection [39]. By integrating this social
data with the textual and temporal techniques described above, Zhao et al. were
able to identify events with high accuracy in two social data sets: the Enron email
data set and the Dailykos dataset. Similarly, Bansal’s group from the University of
Toronto developed the Blogscope project to identify trending and bursty keywords
by location as well as time across the entire “blogosphere” [40,41].
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Soon after, the research community began experimenting with alternative me-
dia sources like blogs, but real gains came when microblogging platforms began their
rise in popularity. These microblogging platforms include Twitter and Sina Weibo
and are characterized by constrained post sizes (e.g., Twitter constrains user posts
to 140 characters) and broadcasting public information. A great deal of research
explores how data posted to these networks can be leveraged to detect events of
various kinds. For example, Becker, Naaman, and Gravano analyzed Twitter to sep-
arate tweets into those about “real-world events” versus non-event messages [42,43].
Diao et al. also developed a retrospective technique to separate tweets into global,
event-related topics and personal topics [44]. This retrospective event detection re-
search is valuable in understanding well-known events, but rapidly detecting events
in streams of social media data is more difficult.
Many researchers have explored motivations for using platforms like Twitter
and have shown interesting dynamics in user behavior around high-impact events.
Lehmann et al.’s 2012 work on collective attention on Twitter explored hashtags and
the different classes of activity around their use [45]. Their work included a class
for activity surrounding unexpected, exogenous events, characterized by a burst in
hashtag usage with little activity leading up to the event. Examples of work on
burst detection includes several domain-specific research efforts that use sporting
events for evaluation [46–48]. Lanagan and Smeaton’s work relied almost solely on
detecting bursts in Twitter’s per-second message volume, which inspired a baseline
method discussed in Chapter 4. Though naive, this frequency approach was able
to detect large bursts on Twitter in high-impact events without complex linguist
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analysis and performs well in streaming contexts as little information must be kept
in memory. Detecting such bursts provide evidence of an event, but it is difficult to
gain insight into that event without additional processing.
One of the most well-known efforts in detecting events from these microblog
streams is the previously mentioned work by Sakaki, Okazaki, and Matsuo on detect-
ing earthquakes in Japan using Twitter [17]. This work demonstrated one can detect
earthquakes using Twitter simply by tracking frequencies of earthquake-related to-
kens. Surprisingly, this approach outperformed geological earthquake detection tools
since digital data propagated faster through wires than tremor waves in the Earth’s
crust. Though this research was limited in that it required pre-specified tokens and
was highly domain- and location-specific (Japan has a high density of Twitter users,
so earthquake detection may perform less well in areas with fewer Twitter users), it
demonstrated a significant use case and the potential of such applications.
Along with Sakaki et al., 2010 saw two other relevant papers: Lin et al.’s
construction of PET, a probabilistic popular event tracker [49], and Petrović, Os-
borne, and Lavrenko’s application of locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) for detecting
first-story tweets from Twitter streams [50]. The PET model by Lin et al. cir-
cumvented the need for language model-based stop word lists by using probabilistic
models to discriminate between common and informational tokens. Secondly, in-
tegrating social and structural features into the event detection task demonstrated
significant performance enhancements could be gained through non-textual features.
Thirdly, their paper built on Kleinberg’s initial work by subsuming his state ma-
chine approach as a degenerate case of the PET model. Like the majority of its
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contemporary systems, however, PET required seeding with a pre-specified list of
tokens to guide its event detection.
Petrović and his colleagues’ research on clustering in Twitter avoided the need
for seed keywords by instead focusing on the practical considerations of cluster-
ing large streams of data quickly. That is, rather than construct a probabilistic
mixture model for each token, Petrović focused on methods for clustering tweets
that contained similar tokens into topical clusters. While typical clustering algo-
rithms require distance calculations for all pairwise messages, LSH facilitated rapid
clustering at the scale necessary to support event detection in Twitter streams by
restricting the number of tweet comparisons to only those within some threshold
of similarity. Once these clusters were generated, Petrović was able to track their
growth over time to determine impact for a given event. This research was unique
in that it was one of the early methods that did not require pre-specified seed to-
kens for detecting events and has been very influential in the field, resulting in a
number of additional publications that demonstrate its utility in breaking news and
high-impact crisis events [21, 51, 52]. An open issue in Petrović’s work, however, is
its reliance on semantic similarity between tweets, which limits its ability to operate
in mixed-language environments.
In 2011, a new method for detecting events using wavelets that could identify
events in Twitter streams without seed keywords was introduced by Weng and
Lee [53]. After stringent filtering (removing stop words, common words, and non-
English tokens), this method used wavelet analysis to isolate and identify bursts
in token frequency along a sliding window. Significant bursts were then converted
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into a cross-correlation matrix against which a graph partitioning algorithm was
run to construct topical clusters. Besides the heavy filtering of the input data, this
approach exhibited notable similarities with the language-agnostic method described
in Chapter 4 with its reliance on bursts to detect event-related tokens. The methods
described in Weng and Lee’s paper, however, was more retrospective, focusing on
daily news rather than breaking news detection on which the research herein focuses.
More recently, Xie et al.’s 2013 paper on TopicSketch performed real-time
event detection from Twitter streams “without pre-defined topical keywords” by
maintaining acceleration features across three levels of granularity: individual token,
bigram, and total stream [54]. As with Petrović’s use of LSH, Xie et al. leveraged
“sketches” and dimensionality reduction to facilitate event detection and also relies
on language-specific similarities. Furthermore, Xie et al. focused only on tweets
from Singapore rather than the worldwide stream.
Despite this extensive body of research, it is worth asking how event detection
on Twitter streams differs from Twitter’s own offerings on “Trending Topics,” which
they make available to all their users. When a user visit’s Twitter’s website, she
is immediately greeted with her personal feed as well as a listing of trending topics
for her city, country, worldwide, or nearly any location she chooses. These topics
offer insight into the current popular topics on Twitter, but the main differentiating
factor is that these popular topics are not necessarily connected to specific events.
Rather, popular memetic content like “#MyLovelifeInMoveTitles” often appear on
the list of trending topics. Additionally, Twitter monetizes these trending topics as
a form of advertising [55]. These trending topics also can be more high-level than
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the interesting moments we seek to identify: for instance, during the World Cup,
particular matches or the tournament in general were identified as trending topics
by Twitter, but individual events like goals or penalty cards in those matches were
not. It should be clear then that Twitter’s trending topics serves a different purpose
than the streaming event detection described herein.
2.3 Credibility and Social Media
Questions of credibility in the digital realm are not new phenomena. After comput-
ers’ mystique and air of infallibility began to fall away in the mid-1990s, human-
computer interaction (HCI) researchers sought terminology to describe and methods
to improve credibility in computer systems. Fogg and Tseng’s 1999 work in this area
argued that, when people spoke of “credibility,” they really referred to the percep-
tion of “believability,” in which the information or output of a computer system
is accepted as true or correct [56]. They went on to describe the nuanced differ-
ences between “credibility” and “trustworthiness,” which they essentially reduced to
whether one trusts the system itself (“trustworthiness”) or the information produced
by the system (“credibility”). While their work was more extensive in describing
various aspects of computer credibility, the definition they presented is particularly
germane to the research laid out in this dissertation because the information extrac-
tion and decision support tools herein hinge on the quality and believability of their
output, and many researchers following this work use this definition of believability.
Furthermore, Fogg and Tseng set the stage for the extensive body of literature in
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this area with their finding that users find computers more credible when the user
has a pressing or critical information need. This necessity is powerful when making
split-second decisions informed by real-time information, so users need to be (but
likely are not) particularly aware of possible issues in credibility when time is most
critical.
In the year following Fogg and Tseng’s deconstruction of credibility, Flana-
gin and Metzger published a piece on users’ perceptions of credibility specific to
the Internet [57]. As people increasingly turned to the Internet as an information
resource despite the potential for exploitation, misinformation, and bias, Flanagin
and Metzger surveyed a significant number of Internet users to explore whether they
found web-based information credible and how credible it was in comparison to other
media. At this early point in the Internet’s life and while respondents’ behaviors
somewhat influenced their perceptions and habits, users found the information on
the Internet mostly as credible as television, radio, and magazines but less credible
than newspapers (a trend that would change over the next five years). As with Fogg
and Tseng, Flanagin and Metzger also further motivated the need for mechanisms
to stimulate, facilitate, or automate users’ ability to verify credibility with their
finding that “few [users] are rigorously verifying the information obtained via the
Internet.”
Paralleling the research into event detection, the next five years saw growing
use of the Internet and the emergence of blogs and the Blogosphere in web users’
habits. During this time, Consumer Reports carried out two studies on trust and
credibility in the Web and found that, over time, news websites had become as
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trusted and credible as their newspaper counterparts [58,59]. Blogs and their early
social networks on the other hand, while not even mentioned in the 2002 survey,
were found almost wholly untrustworthy in 2005 even among the small percentage
of respondents who said they had visited blogs.
This sentiment changed rapidly though, and by 2007, the work of Johnson,
Kaye, et al. found politically interested web users had begun to seek out political
blogs and judged them as moderately credible [60]. Interestingly though, these
politically minded web users judged blogs “as more credible than any mainstream
media or online source” in terms of depth of analysis but ranked blogs poorly with
respect to fairness. Johnson et al. hypothesized these findings were partially the
result of an information selection bias in that these politically minded users had
actively sought out the blogs, which suggested user intentions had significant bearing
on perceptions of credibility.
At about this time, social media platforms like MySpace, Facebook, Yahoo!
Answers, and Twitter (which opened in 2007) were rising in prominence (except for
perhaps MySpace, which was being supplanted). Soon thereafter, Agichtein et al.
began investigating automated methods for identifying high-quality content in such
platforms, specifically Yahoo! Answers. Along the same vein as Fisher et al. [61],
McCallum et al. [62], and Welser et al. [63], this work sought to integrate not only
content-based features but also “non-content information” like structural relation-
ships between answerers, answerer roles, click count, dwell time, and patterns of
behavior of highly voted answerers. Agichtein and his colleagues then demonstrated
a classification mechanism built with these textual and non-textual features could
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discriminate between high- and low-quality Yahoo! Answers content with high ac-
curacy. They theorized that such an approach could be generalized to other social
networking platforms that exposed similar structural, non-textual features.
Again following event detection vogue, researchers’ fascination with credibility
in social networks really became a fascination with Twitter and other social net-
works, and from 2010 onward, numerous studies were published on credibility in
Twitter each year. 2010 in particular saw a pair of studies on Twitter’s dark side
in political campaigns. Mustafaraj and Metaxas investigated Twitter usage during
several elections and how spammers and malicious entities used the platform to at-
tack political candidates [64]. Their exploration focused specifically on how search
engines were providing “real-time search results” backed by Twitter with little re-
gard for veracity, which resulted in spammers’ first instance of a “Twitterbomb” on
Google’s search pages. By creating numerous fake accounts with compelling posts,
all of which led back to a single web page, spammers were able to entice actual
users to retweet the spam content and reach a much broader audience. Mustafaraj
and Metaxas’s results also revealed the interaction networks between the accounts
they flagged as possible spam sources differed significantly from interaction networks
between actual users.
The second such study saw the creation of the Truthy system by Ratkiewicz
et al. [65]. Truthy’s purpose was to detect memetic attacks on political candidates,
specifically attacks that used “astroturf” memes to spread misinformation and cre-
ate a false sense of grassroots support for this misinformation. To support Truthy,
Ratkiewicz et al. built the Klatsch framework to process daily batches of Twitter
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data, detect memes in that data, and assign a “truthiness score” to each meme.
Truthy detected these memes by first filtering based on a curated set of politically
relevant keywords and popularity (a threshold of mentions per hour) then analyzed
each meme’s diffusion characteristics and sentiment. As part of this diffusion anal-
ysis, Truthy identified the most prolific broadcasters of a particular meme. Then,
using supervised learning, Ratkiewicz et al. developed a “truthiness” classifier to
discriminate between “truthy” and “legitimate” memes with an accuracy exceed-
ing 90%. Therefore, Ratkiewicz et al. showed that not only was Twitter a vehicle
for both legitimate and malicious information, they also demonstrated feasibility in
discovering and removing misinformation.
Perhaps 2010’s most compelling exploration of credibility in social media was
again from Yahoo! Research with Mendoza et al.’s study of Twitter use during the
2010 Chile earthquake [66]. During this natural disaster, Twitter played a significant
role in communication and coordination, but it was also a source of constant misin-
formation, which added to feelings of chaos. The authors investigated how high- and
low-quality information diffused through the social network by comparing verifiable
news and events with the spread of rumors, which led to a significant finding: true
tweets tended to have extremely low rates of contradiction (that is, for every 100
tweets about a piece of true information, one might see only one tweet that con-
tradicted that information), and rumors exhibited much higher rates of questioning
and contradiction (nearly a 1:1 ratio). This result suggested a potentially powerful
feature in identifying misinformation in Twitter.
Mendoza et al. followed up this work in 2011 with automated methods for
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applying their lessons learned during the 2010 Chile earthquake [8]. This study
leveraged information propagation (via retweet analysis), user certainty, use of ex-
ternal sources (i.e., web links), and user characteristics like follower count as features
for a supervised machine learning system capable of classifying high- and low-quality
information. The authors relied on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to generate a labeled
set of tweets with varying degrees of plausibility/credibility and used decision trees
to learn this classification task with 86% accuracy. From these features and their
classifiers, they concluded the most credible data on Twitter would generally start
with one to a few users and exhibit deep retweet networks. This result, however, is
possibly contradicted by more recent events like the various instances of compromise
of otherwise credible accounts (e.g., the AP and White House attack).
Similarly, Gupta and Kumaraguru’s analysis of Twitter usage during the Mum-
bai terrorist attacks in 2011 showed tweets by authoritative users (users with many
followers) were exceedingly rare [12]. Since a significant amount of useful situational
information is communicated via Twitter in the moments after a crisis [1], one must
rely on information posted by potentially inaccurate users during these times. For-
tunately, Gupta and Kumaraguru returned in 2012 with methods for ranking tweets
by credibility during such high-impact events [9].
At the same time, Qazvinian et al. created a data set of tweets and Twitter
users replete with labels of which tweets were rumors versus non-rumors and which
users were rumor believers/propagators versus rumor disbelievers [67]. From this
data set, the authors built a framework capable of classifying tweets and users
accordingly. Their classifiers leveraged features of tweet content and constituent
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parts of speech, network structure with respect to original tweets versus retweets,
and embedded entities like hashtags and external references. Qazvinian et al. then
demonstrated feasibility in using Bayesian and log-linear models built around these
features to discriminate between rumors and non-rumors successfully. This work is
particularly interesting in the context of the research presented in this dissertation
because it focuses more on the quality of informational tweets rather than particular
users, a focus also present in Chapter 6.
2012 saw a slight shift in how credibility analysis was being applied to social
networks like Twitter. Rather than focusing on the informational content and its
credibility, researchers began using social media to identify potentially valuable or
credible human sources. First, Kang et al. published a paper on modeling topic-
specific credibility, but instead of considering the credibility of a particular topic (as
done previously regarding astroturf rumors), they focused on finding social media
users whose opinions or posts about the topics would be credible [7]. Diakopoulos
et al. followed a similar path in their piece of assessing social media sources for
journalism [11]. Again, rather than analyzing topical credibility, Diakopoulos et
al. designed a journalism support tool to find credible eye witnesses to an event
of interest based on several cues, such as location, external references, mentions of
entities, and whether the user was using a mobile platform. While this research
potentially conflated trust and credibility (as cautioned by Fogg and Tseng 15 years
ago), cues like whether a post is from a mobile device or not are compelling in
that such information is easily available and potentially informative in a real-time
setting.
28
This shift towards finding credible users is not the only change in credible social
media research. Several approaches have sought to be more proactive in supporting
human credibility assessment. In 2011, Schwarz and Morris explored methods for
augmenting search results with visualizations to support users in assessing credibil-
ity of sources on the front end [68]. Morris returned in 2012 with a Twitter-specific
version of this work in which Twitter search results were augmented to include
otherwise obscured credibility cues like follower counts, user locations, verified ac-
counts, perceived expertise, and consistency of topics posted by the author [69]. The
value here is that these studies show feasibility in augmenting systems to support
enhanced credibility, which establishes part of this dissertation’s foundation.
It is worth noting here that, in addition to work on credibility in social me-
dia, an extensive corpus of research covers issues of trust in users. A number of
algorithms attempt to gauge user trustworthiness, potential trust between users,
or recommend items based on trust between users [70–72]. While these resources
are certainly important, the research presented in this dissertation focuses more on
aggregate analysis of credible information from many users rather than evaluating
trust between two specific users.
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Chapter 3: Twitter Response to Terrorism
Social media has become an important tool during crises, and public interest in using
these social platforms during crises is well-documented in recent surveys [26]. This
interest has translated into an expectation that government organizations provide
updated information about emergencies through social network channels [73], with
recent federal efforts seeking to improve communication during emergency situations
[30]. Companies are also responding to these needs with offerings like Twitter Alerts1
and Facebook’s SafetyCheck2.
Though emergency situations manifest in many forms and timeframes, terror-
ist attacks are of particular importance given their destabilizing and panic-inducing
effects. With many people turning to social media for coverage and information
about terrorist attacks, understanding user response to these events on these plat-
forms could yield valuable insights. Such insights could assist event detection and
computational journalism algorithms to discover terrorist attacks as they occur or
improve recommendation systems that highlight information from local sources (lo-
cal law enforcement or news organizations).




developed countries with large Twitter populations complicates this research. Some
work has broached this topic, but much of it focuses on single terrorist acts with
limited generalization [12,26,52,74]. Olteanu, Vieweg, and Castillo’s work on social
media response to crises enhances this generalizability in the broader context of
all disasters, but has limited coverage of terrorist attacks [4]. Their work shed
light on the types of content users share during these crises but omits analysis of
behavioral responses on social media (e.g., information sharing or seeking behaviors
like sharing media or other user’s content). Behavioral signals like increased message
or user volume, hashtag use, or sharing other users’ posts (called “retweeting” in
Twitter) could signal the onset of high-impact events like terrorist attacks or other
crises.
To elucidate these responses, this chapter presents an investigation into so-
cial media use in developed, Western countries during five terror events: the 2013
Boston Marathon bombing, the 2014 Sydney hostage crisis, the 2015 Paris Charlie
Hebdo shootings, the 2015 Paris November attacks, and the 2016 Brussels bomb-
ings. This work analyzes information sharing behaviors (retweeting, hashtag usage,
mentions, etc.), information seeking behaviors through changes in follower counts,
and social interactions before and after these events. This exploration characterizes
public response to these events and identifies important accounts during these crises
(findings show a preference for local police, if present on Twitter, and local news
affiliates).
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3.1 Events and Data Collection
As mentioned, this work characterizes public response on Twitter across five terror-
related events. To test significance of behavioral changes in response to these events,
the analysis covers two weeks before and after each event, based on the following
dates (in Coordinated Universal Time, or UTC):
• The Boston Marathon bombing and resulting manhunt on 15-19 April 2013,
• The 2014 Sydney hostage crisis on 14-15 December 2014,
• The Charlie Hebdo attack and manhunt between 7-9 January 2015,
• The 2015 Paris attacks on 13-14 November 2015, and
• The 2016 Brussels bombings on 22 March 2016.
This work leveraged a corpus of tweets gathered from Twitter’s 1% public
sample stream between April 2013 and April 2016, with an average of approximately
four million tweets per day. This corpus was created using the twitter-tools library3
developed for evaluations at the National Institute for Standards and Technology’s
(NIST’s) TExt Retrieval Conferences (TRECs). Others have explored bias in this
sample and have shown that, while local events and long-tail coverage are lost in
this sample, high-impact events, trending topics, and network structure for many
accounts are conserved [75, 76]. Given the highly impactful nature of these events,
this 1% sample should be adequate for judging Twitter’s immediate responses.
3https://github.com/lintool/twitter-tools
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Biases aside, Twitter data is also known to contain a non-trivial amount of
spam and noise [77,78], motivating the need for a method to remove irrelevant con-
tent. To that end, this analysis compares unfiltered and relevancy-filtered data from
each four-week period. Similar to the work by Olteanu et al., relevant Twitter data is
identified using a simple keyword search method [4]. These keywords were “boston”
for the Boston Marathon bombing, “sydney” for the Sydney Hostage Crisis, either
“paris” or “hebdo” for the Charlie Hebdo Attack, “paris” for the November attacks,
and “brussels”, “bruxelles”, “brussel”, “zaventem” for the Brussels bombings.. This
search is case-insensitive and matches keywords embedded in hashtags. Further-
more, neither retweets nor short tweets are removed since retweets are one of the
behaviors of interest. Furthermore, retweets affect structure in the interaction graph
and supports identifying central actors during these crises. Table 3.1 reports dates,
keywords, and tweet counts for each event.
3.2 Twitter Behavioral Analysis
While Twitter restricts messages to 140 characters, users have a wide variety of
content they can share in this small space: links to other websites, hashtags, multi-
media, mentions of other users, and retweets. Trends in these artifacts evolve over
time, exhibiting patterns in information sharing. To this end, these artifacts are
analyzed for significant shifts in usage around target events, as determined through
two tests: 1) calculating whether an activity’s frequency changes by more than
three times the median absolute deviation (MAD) in response to the event, and 2)
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Table 3.1: Twitter Data During Terrorist Attacks



































performing a Welch’s t-test on whether data before the event differs significantly
from after (all tests are two-tailed, assume different variances, and performed at
p < 0.05). The following questions explore these activities:
• RQ1 Is overall Twitter activity affected by the event?
• RQ2 Does relevant tweet volume change during the event?
• RQ3 Does the proportion of retweets, links, hashtags, mentions, or media
change during the target event?
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• RQ4 Do follower counts change for important accounts during the event?
• RQ5 How long do these changes persist?
• RQ6 What users emerge as important during terror attacks?
RQ1 and RQ2 are motivated by research that shows people’s intent to seek/share
information increases in response to crises and asks whether this effect holds for
Twitter [79]. RQ3 then identifies which specific artifacts are most affected by
these events; e.g., significant increases in retweets might indicate higher information
sharing as Twitter users rebroadcast information to their followers or join the con-
versation. RQ4 then measures information seeking behavior by quantifying users’
subscriptions to and thus seeking from important Twitter accounts. RQ5 charac-
terizes duration of these effects, about which existing research conflicts. Olteanu et
al. [4] showed changes on Twitter can persist for a few days to nearly two months,
with the Boston Marathon bombing persisting for 60 days, but Koutra, Bennett,
and Horvitz demonstrated shocking events rarely influenced long-term user behavior
in digital communities beyond social networks [80].
During such crises, it is also unclear which accounts contribute the most to dis-
cussion and coverage. This question is investigated in RQ6 by converting Twitter’s
retweet and mention activity into a directed graph of interactions, where the vertices
represent Twitter users, and the edges denote mentions/retweets. Research shows
users with many followers or retweets often are not the most influential users [81].
Instead, this work follows Kwak et al. and uses a version of the PageRank algorithm
to identify important accounts in these networks [82].
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3.3 Results
A first step in understanding public Twitter response is to examine general behavior
through 1% sample stream and its artifacts. Analysis of this data in Figures 3.1a-
3.1e shows general Twitter activity is unaffected by these events (the black-asterisk
curve denotes tweet volume on the right vertical axis and remaining curves show
tweet proportions on the left axis). Statistical analysis shows few significant changes
in activity: increases in retweets and hashtags on the day of the Boston Marathon
bombing; increases in retweets, mentions, and hashtags during the Paris November
attacks; and an increase in retweets during the Brussels bombings. The data set
for the Brussels bombings, however, has a discontinuity on 31 March where data
collection failed, resulting in a large drop in tweets collected on that day. In general,
overall tweet and user volume and other activities are unaffected by these events,
thereby addressing RQ1.
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(e) The Brussels Bombings
Figure 3.1: General Twitter Activity
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(e) The Brussels Bombings
Figure 3.2: Relevant Twitter Activity
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For RQ2 and RQ3 (relevant tweet volume and changes in activities), Fig-
ures 3.2a-3.2e show the black-asterisk curve of tweet volume on the right axis with
remaining curves corresponding to tweet proportions on the left. Tweet volume in-
creased on the date of each terror event, with references to Boston increasing from
about 828 tweets per day to 138,000 on the day of the bombing. Sydney saw a
smaller increase from an average 1,119 tweets per day to 16,000, the Charlie Hebdo
attack increased from 2,288 to nearly 78,000, the Paris November attacks increased
from near 3,000 to 172,000, and Brussels went from 320 to 72,000. Each event’s first
day was between 42 and 823 times the MAD. In all cases except Brussels, relevant
tweets returned to pre-event levels within four days of the event (p < 0.05). In an-
swer to RQ2, Twitter saw a significant increase in references to the target events on
the day the terror attack starts, but these references quickly decreased in frequency.
For RQ3, in Boston, proportions of retweets, web links, media, and hashtags
exceeded three times the MAD for 15 April, with retweets, media, and hashtags
seeing increases while links decrease. Proportion of tweets containing mentions
were not significantly affected. Of these activities, a significant change occurred in
retweets and link sharing before and after the event (p < 0.05). Sydney saw a similar
deviation from the MAD on 15 December in retweets, links, and tweets containing
hashtags, with mentions being the only activity that decreased. The Welch’s t-test
also shows links continued to deviate from pre-event levels for the remainder of
the time period, while all other activities returned to pre-event levels within four
days. During the Charlie Hebdo attack on 7 January, retweets, media sharing, and
hashtags also significantly deviated from the MAD. Links once again see a drop
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in usage, but the change is not significant on the first day of the attack. Average
trends in all sharing activities except retweets differed significantly before and after
the event (p < 0.01 for mentions, links, media, and hashtags). Furthermore, average
daily mentions decreased following the event, whereas all other activities saw an
increase. In the Paris November attacks, retweets, hashtags, and links were the
only activities to deviate from the MAD. Finally, for Brussels, retweets, mentions,
and hashtags deviate from the MAD. Retweets and hashtags increased immediately
following these events, while link sharing responded more slowly. Tweets including
media and mentions are inconsistently affected.
To answer RQ4, the Boston Police Department (@bostonpolice), the New
South Wales Police Department (@nswpolice), Charlie Hebdo (@Charlie Hebdo -
), the Parisian “Recherche Personne” account (@SOSParis1311), and the Brussels
Airport (@BrusselsAirport) were examined. The Boston Police Department and
Chalie Hebdo saw massive increases in followers. Prior to the event, the Boston
Police Department had an average of 54k followers, which increased significantly to
264k followers on the day of the manhunt and peaked at over 300k through the end
of the month. Similarly, followers of Charlie Hebdo increased from an average of
77k to 318k. The NSW Police Department also sees a significant increase, though
not as substantial, from 61k to 80k followers. The “Recherche Personne” account
was unique in that it was created in response to the event, quickly amassed 5k
followers on the day of the event, and saw a maximum of nearly 14k followers over
the next four days. The Brussels airport account saw an increase similar to the
NSW Police Department, going from 27k followers to 34k on the day of the event
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with a maximum near 50k over the next two weeks.
Increases in the first three accounts’ followers were also tested for significance,
and each differed significantly from the average: Users referring to Boston, Sydney,
and Paris saw a mean increase of 78, 136, and 253 followers (σ = 2, 753, 989, and
2, 731) respectively. Therefore, all three accounts experienced significant increases
in followers (p < 0.01), with rapid increases that level off within 7 days.
For effect duration (RQ5), retweets and hashtags exhibited significant but
short-lived surges. Retweets referencing Boston retreated to 36% from a high of
59% on 15 April, and hashtags dropped from 52% to 31%; hashtag usage before the
bombing and seven days after was not significantly different (p > 0.05). Similarly
for the Sydney Hostage Crisis, retweets and hashtags returned to pre-event levels
with no statistical difference (p > 0.01) within seven days. During the Charlie
Hebdo attack, retweets were similar, but hashtags remained significantly higher than
their pre-event levels for at least the next two weeks (p < 0.01). During the Paris
November attacks, Welch’s t-test showed mentions, links, and hashtags diverged
from pre-event levels for the remainder of the time period (p < 0.01). Brussels
likewise saw links diverge from pre-event levels over the next two weeks along with
retweets (p < 0.01) (though these effects may result from the data collection failure
mentioned above). For links, after all events except the Sydney Hostage Crisis, link
sharing increased and remained high, and while followers showed a slight decrease
after the event, they remained significantly higher than pre-event levels. In answer
to RQ5, changes in retweets and hashtags persisted for only a few days, whereas
link sharing and follower counts saw sustained increases for at least two weeks after
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the events.
Table 3.2 answers RQ6 and depicts the ten most central accounts during each
event. The Boston Police Department was the most central account during the
Boston Marathon bombing, closely followed by the Boston Globe. With the ex-
ception of @JFKLibrary and @bostonmarathon, all other accounts belong to news
affiliates, three of which are local to the city of Boston (@BostonGlobe, @Boston-
DotCom, and @7News). Central accounts in Sydney also included government/law
enforcement agencies (@nswpolice, @TonyAbbottMHR), news organizations (@abc-
news, @BBCBreaking), and several unaffiliated accounts. Response to the Charlie
Hebdo Attack was similar in that many central accounts belong to news organiza-
tions but differed noticeably with the absence of law enforcement. For the Paris
November attacks, the most central account, @SOSParis1311, was an account cre-
ated in response to the event to help people find friends and loved ones with several
others being local to Paris (with the notable exception of US presidential candidate
Donald Trump’s account). The Brussels bombings continued these trends with the
most central accounts belonging first to a Belgian newspaper, Le Soir, the Brussels
airport account, and a European Union crisis center in Belgium, @CrisiscenterBE,
followed by major media organizations.
3.4 Observations
An important observation is the limited response in Twitter’s sample stream; none
of these events altered much of the overall Twitter activity. Given that the US and
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Table 3.2: Central Accounts (Highest Rank to Least)
Rank Boston Sydney Charlie Hebdo Paris Nov. Brussels
1 BostonPolice abcnews itele SOSParis1311 lesoir
2 BostonGlobe TonyAbbottMHR Charlie Hebdo Rech Paris lesoirplus
3 JFKLibrary nswpolice AFP ParisFilmes BrusselsAirport
4 AP 9NewsSyd AFPphoto AFP realDonaldTrump
5 BostonDotCom CottomSydney Le Figaro le Parisien CrisiscenterBE
6 7News sydneyharbert jmdecugis AureliaBAILLY AP
7 bostonmarathon abit wp le Parisien alafolieparis19 MailOnline
8 ReutersUS WolfSpirit2013 plantu AP SkyNews
9 YourAnonNews 9NewsAUS BFMTV ParisVictims Conflicts
10 Reuters BBCBreaking ctxt es YouTube FoxNews
France account for more than 25% of Twitter’s user base [83], one would expect
such national events to have a stronger effect. Gupta and Kumaraguru also suggest
that sharing links increase during terrorist events [12], but this response is only
present when constraining the analysis to relevant tweets. Despite absent overall
response, Figures 3.2a-3.2e show a portion of Twitter does respond to these events,
with relevant tweets accounting for 1 − 4% of all tweet activity on those days.
Taken together, surges in these activities suggest higher information sharing during
these times even if these surges drop off quickly, which demonstrates Twitter’s short
memory as relevant tweet volume dropped by 80% within three days. Follower
counts are an exception as they remained high for at least two weeks after the
events.
Central accounts also show an interesting result: In all five cases, several news
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affiliates emerged as leading sources of information. This result is unsurprising given
media organizations report breaking news, but the presence of local organizations
suggests users value information sourced close to the event. This result also cor-
roborates Sutton et al. [74], who showed local actors emerged as highly influential
in Boston. Information from authoritative sources like local law enforcement have
more influence on the public than random users and major media organizations [26],
and the popularity of local crisis response organizations is consistent here.
3.5 Consequences for Event Detection Algorithms
This chapter explores public Twitter response by characterizing trends in activi-
ties and accounts mentioned during terrorist attacks. Results show relevant tweets,
retweets, and hashtags increase significantly and immediately and return to pre-
event levels within days. Longer-lived responses appear in link sharing and fol-
lowers for central accounts. At the same time, the public coalesces around po-
lice/government (where available) and local news organizations when sharing infor-
mation. Results show a surge of interest in local crisis responder agencies during
the majority of events, but these results show little government presence during the
attacks in Paris, with the majority of response being from local response or media
organizations.
For further work in event detection, these results suggest one cannot rely on
simple frequency-based analysis methods to identify high-impact events. That is,
these events did not drive increases in overall Twitter message or user volume.
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Instead, results revealed bursts in topically relevant activity and relevant account
followership, suggesting these events are identifiable with mechanisms that detect
changes at the topic and account levels. Known, relevant keywords like “paris” or
“boston” experience bursts in usage, as demonstrated above, lending credence to
these methods. Future work therefore should explore methods for identifying these
relevant, bursty keywords, methods for which are discussed in the following chapters.
3.5.1 Other Future Work
Related to the aforementioned results on topically relevant bursts, two additional
avenues of future work could follow on from this work. First, the similarities across
user responses to these events in Twitter suggest one may be able to construct
a vocabulary of crisis/terrorist attack response. A data-driven approach to un-
derstanding these responses could inform future crisis response research and allow
analysts to identify potentially local terror-related events that do not achieve the
same level of notoriety as the events described herein.
Furthermore, given that these crisis-level events effect changes in Twitter’s
topical distribution without increasing the volume of tweets, an interesting corollary
is that other topics of discussion must receive less attention in response to these
events. Therefore, and interesting open question is whether patterns exist in what




This work has several limitations, each of which can be grouped into one of two
categories: Twitter-specific limitations, and selection limitations.
The main limitation specific to Twitter is that relevant tweets are likely
under-sampled given the relatively simplistic method employed for identifying rel-
evant tweets. An example of this issue can be seen with relevant content like the
Boston Police Department’s tweet after capturing the second suspect in the Boston
Marathon bombings: “CAPTURED!!! The hunt is over. The search is done. The
terror is over. And justice has won. Suspect in custody.” This tweet is clearly
relevant to the event but does not include specific references to Boston or the bomb-
ing. Rather than searching for tweets that contain specific substrings from a small
set of keywords, future work could leverage more sophisticated information retrieval
methods like query expansion or identify seed users to capture additional relevant
data.
Another limitation in the Twitter data used here is that it provides limited
insight into information seeking or data consumption behaviors. Follower counts
yield some insight into users’ reading habits, but Twitter provides both a logged-
out experience (i.e., a user can consume Twitter content without logging into the
platform), and the data set used here has no information on tweet views. As a result,
the analysis presented herein is unable to track or model passive interactions or which
tweets are the most viewed. Partnerships with Twitter or leveraging additional
analytics platforms may be able to address these weaknesses.
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Other limitations in this work focus more on issues of selecting platforms and
data. The most glaring weakness here is the omission of other platforms. Typical so-
cial networking sites like Facebook and reddit and atypical platforms like Snapchat
or regionally popular networks like WeChat and Weibo also contain valuable re-
sponses. Platforms will likely exhibit unique responses in coverage beyond structural
differences (e.g., Facebook users share content via “shares” rather than “retweets”),
and exploring these responses might yield additional insight into population-level
and cultural response to these events. Furthermore, aligning or triangulating data
across these platforms could yield a more holistic picture of events (e.g., Instagram
is focused on sharing images, which might give a different view into responses).
Another potential limitation in this work comes from the focus on terrorist
attacks. While they are impactful at a national level, it is possible that the global
audience may not be as interested in these events as they are in truly international
events like the World Cup or Olympics. Such international events are potentially
more interesting to a wider audience, suggesting they are in some sense more news-
worthy or interesting. The possibly limited international newsworthiness of these
terrorist attacks may then be the driving force behind why they have little to no
effect on general, global Twitter activity.
Finally, this work is specific to developed, Western countries, but these results
may not hold for terror attacks in less developed countries or where terrorism occurs
more often. Future efforts should broaden topical and geographic scope and explore
other major social media platforms.
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Chapter 4: Language-Agnostic Event Discovery in Streams
Social media’s utility during crises along with the prevalence of media organiza-
tions on the platforms has driven research around the role of social media in news
consumption and production. Works by Petrovic et al., Kwak et al., and Vis have
all explored social media as a platform for disseminating and consuming news and
comparing Twitter to newswire sources [21, 25, 82]. At the same time, works by
Diakopoulos et al. have leveraged social media as a journalistic tool to evaluate de-
bate performance and identify expert and eye witness sources [11, 84]. These areas
of research have laid the foundation for the new field of computational journalism.
One of social media’s major advantages for computational journalism is its
rapid nature: near real-time feedback and information are available about nearly any
event. To track this data, however, one must be able to identify these events at the
same velocity. Many current approaches to event detection rely on prior knowledge
and keyword engineering to detect events of interest or are delayed while relevant
keywords are determined. While straightforward and capable, such approaches are
often constrained to events one can easily anticipate or describe in general terms,
potentially missing impactful but unexpected key moments. For instance, one can
follow the frequency of “goal” on Twitter during the 2014 World Cup to detect when
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goals are scored [14], but interesting occurrences like penalties or missed goals would
be excluded. One might respond to this weakness by tracking additional penalty-
related tokens, but one cannot continually enlarge the keyword set for all cases.
Furthermore, one would still be unable to identify an unexpected moment like Luis
Suarez’s biting Giorgio Chiellini during the Uruguay-Italy World Cup match; who
would have thought to include “bite” as a relevant token? Relying on predefined
keywords also restricts these systems to languages represented by the seed keywords,
a significant issue for international events like the World Cup.
Given social media’s high volume, one could forgo seed keywords and leverage
time series analysis to track bursts in message frequency (as with Vasudevan et
al. [46]). Such methods gain flexibility by sacrificing semantic information about
detected events (one would need to extract keywords causing such bursts manually)
but rely on the signal to be present in the data. In social media’s case, this reliance
implies that either the volume of messages or the volume of users on a social media
platform changes in response to the target events. As shown in the previous chapter,
however, major events like terrorist attacks have limited effect on overall Twitter
message or user volume.
This chapter instead introduces LABurst, a language-agnostic burst detection
algorithm that uses machine learning and distributed high-performance processing
to identify topical or token-specific bursts in Twitter without requiring pre-specified
domain keywords. LABurst combines the topical and frequency analysis approaches
to identify bursts at the individual token level. The number of tokens experiencing
a burst at any given time is then an indicator of a high-impact or key moment; that
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is, as more tokens experience a simultaneous burst, the higher the impact of that
moment. Intuition behind this approach is that, when a major event occurs, many
users post messages about the event relatively simultaneously, but these users may
use different keywords to describe the same event. Therefore, when many keywords
experience a burst, or are “bursty,” at approximately the same time, they are likely
to be related, and the larger the set of bursty keywords, the higher impact the event.
Examples of this intuition include many users posting about a goal in the World
Cup using various forms of the word “goal” (e.g., “goal,” “gol,” “gooooal,” etc.) or
about a bombing with related terms like “bomb” or “explosion.”
Contrasting with existing work, LABurst operates in the streaming context.
This flexibility is illustrated with experiments on Twitter’s sample stream surround-
ing key moments in large sporting competitions and two natural disasters. The
motivation for using sporting events here is two-fold: first, large-audience sport-
ing events are more common and regularly occurring than natural disasters, and
major sporting events have well-defined events in terms of goals, fouls, and similar
moments of play.
LABurst is evaluated by comparing it to two baselines: a time series-based
burst detection technique, and a domain-specific technique with a pre-determined
set of relevant keywords. Results from these experiments demonstrate LABurst’s
competitiveness with existing methods. This work makes the following contribu-
tions:
• Presents a streaming algorithm and feature set for the discovery and descrip-
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tion of impactful and unexpected key moments in Twitter’s public sample
stream without requiring manually defined keywords,
• Demonstrates LABurst’s performance is both competitive and flexible, and
• Transfers sports-trained models to the higher-impact domain of disaster re-
sponse.
4.1 Moment Discovery Defined
This chapter demonstrates LABurst’s ability to discover and describe impactful mo-
ments from social media streams without prior knowledge of event types or domains.
To that end, one must first lay LABurst’s foundations by defining the problem
LABurst seeks to solve and presenting the model around which LABurst is built.
4.1.1 Problem Definition
Given an unfiltered (though potentially down-sampled) stream S of messages m con-
sisting of various tokens w (where a “token” is defined as a space-delimited string)1,
the objective is to determine whether each time slice t contains an impactful moment
and, if so, extract tokens that describe the moment. Identifying and describing such
moments separately is difficult because, by the time one can react to a key moment
with a separate analysis, the moment may have passed. A “key moment” is defined
as a brief instant in time, lasting on the order of seconds, that a journalist would
1“Token” is more general than a “keyword” as it includes numbers, emoticons, hashtags, or
web links
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label as “breaking news.” Key moments might comprise the highlights of a sport-
ing competition, the moment an earthquake strikes, the moment a terrorist attack
occurs, or similar. Such moments often generate significant popular interest, affect
large populations, or represent an otherwise instrumental moment in larger event
(e.g., the World Cup). By focusing on these instantaneous moments of activity, the
complexities of defining “events” and the hierarchies among them are avoided.
Formally, E denotes the set of all time slices t in which a key moment occurs.
The indicator function 1E(St, t) takes the stream S up to time t and returns a 1
for all times t in which an impactful moment occurs, and 0 for all other values of
t. The moment discovery task is then to approximate this indicator function. The
function BE(St, t) is also included and returns a set of words w that describe the
discovered moment at time t if t ∈ E and an empty set otherwise. To account for
possible lag in reporting the event, typing out a message about the event, and the
message actually posting to a social media server, a delay parameter τ relaxes the
task by constructing the set E ′ where, for all t ∈ E, t, t + 1, t + 2, ..., t + τ ∈ E ′.
Since LABurst’s evaluation compares methods that share the same ground truth,
and controlling τ affects the ground truth consistently, comparative results should
be unaffected. For the following experiments, the following value is used: τ = 2.
False positives/negatives and true positives/negatives follow in the normal
way for some candidate function 1̂E′(St, t): a false positive is any time t such
that 1̂E′(St, t) = 1 and 1E′(St, t) = 0; likewise, a false negative is any t such that
1̂E′(St, t) = 0 and 1E′(St, t) = 1. True positives/negatives follow as expected.
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4.1.2 The LABurst Model
LABurst combines the language-agnostic flexibility of burst detection techniques
with the specificity of domain-specific algorithms. This integration results from
ingesting a social media stream, maintaining a sliding window of frequencies for
each token contained within the stream, and using the number of bursty tokens in
a given time period as an indicator of the moment’s impact. Critically, these tokens
can be of any language and are neither stemmed, normalized, or otherwise modified.
Most other approaches use language models to collapse these various token forms,
whereas LABurst leverages this information as a predictor.
In more detail, LABurst runs a sliding window over the incoming data stream
S and divides it into slices of a fixed number of seconds δ such that time ti−ti−1 = δ.
LABurst then combines a set number ω of these slices into a single window (with
an overlap of ω − 1 slices), splits each message in that window into a set of tokens,
and tabulates each token’s frequency. By maintaining a list of frequency tables
from the past k windows up to time t, LABurst constructs features describing a
token’s changes in frequency. From these features, one can separate tokens into two
classes: bursty tokens Bt, and non-bursty tokens B
′
t. Following this classification,
if the number of bursty tokens exceeds some threshold |Bt| ≥ ρ, LABurst flags this
window at time t as containing a high-impact moment. In this manner, LABurst
approximates the target indicator function with 1̂E′(St, t) = |Bt| ≥ ρ and yields Bt
as the set of descriptive tokens for the given moment.
Unlike the previous chapter, retweets are discarded to avoid spurious bursts
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since existing literature shows retweets propagate extremely rapidly, which could
lead to false bursts [82].
4.1.3 Temporal Features
To capture token burst dynamics, LABurst uses a set of temporal and graphical fea-
tures to model these effects, summarized in Table 4.1. These features are calculated
per token and normalized into the range [0, 1] to avoid scaling issues. Each feature’s
relative importance is then examined through an ablation study described later.
Table 4.1: Features
Feature Description
Frequency Regression Scores a token by how well its frequency fits an exponential curve.
Average Frequency Difference Score using the difference between the average frequency over the
past few minutes and the current minute.
Inter-Arrival Time The average number of seconds between token occurrences in the
previous k windows.
Entropy The entropy of the set of messages containing a given token.
Density The density of the @-mention network of users who use a given
token.
TF-IDF The term frequency, inverse document frequency for a each token.
TF-PDF A modified version of TF-IDF called term frequency, proportional
document frequency [85].




Exponential curves are often associated with bursts in usage or cascades in social
networks, and capturing whether a token’s usage fits this pattern could indicate
an important event. To measure this fit, this feature is generated by applying
linear regression in logarithmic (log) space to each token’s per-slice frequency over
the current window. This estimation is performed in log space since exponential
curves are linear in log space, and linear regression is a fast approximation for linear
curves. Regression results yield an approximation of the frequency’s slope (the ratio
between vertical change and horizontal change) of a line that best fits this time
series. The slope of the best-fitting line is then taken as the token’s score since
higher slopes indicate steeper exponential curves. This feature is duplicated across
token frequency, message frequency, and user frequency.
4.1.3.2 Frequency Differences
Another method for capturing the intensity of a burst in token usage is to compare a
token’s current frequency with its prior frequencies. Simple first differences (i.e., the
difference between the current slice’s frequency and previous slice’s frequency) can
be noisy, however, so this feature compares the current frequency with an average
over the previous slices. Eq. 4.1 shows how this feature is calculated, where k is
the number of slices in the sliding window. The frequency of a token w for a given
time slice t is defined as freqt(w). As with the regression feature, this feature is
calculated for token, message, and user frequency, meaning that freqt(w) returns
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raw token frequency, the number of messages containing the token, and the number
of users using the token respectively.







When many users are posting about the same event, one might expect all these
users to post at approximately the same time. In contrast, if a few users are posting
about a less impactful event, long periods of time may pass without seeing a tweet
containing a relevant token. Therefore, the amount of lag time between the arrival
of two tweets that contain the same token could indicate how impactful an event
is. To this end, this feature measures the average number of seconds between token
occurrences in the previous k windows.
4.1.3.4 Entropy
In text processing/information theory, Shannon entropy measures the amount of
information conveyed by an observation. Accordingly, events that occur very rarely
or very frequently convey less information as they are more predictable than events
that occur more randomly (e.g., events with a probability of 0.5). Calculating
a token’s entropy then captures the degree of randomness or information in that
token; for instance, stop words occur very frequently and therefore convey little
information, and rare strings are not being used often and are likely uninteresting.
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Hence, the information entropy for a token w is a useful feature and is calculated
according to Eq. 4.2, where Pt(w) =
freqt(w)∑V
i=0 freqt(wi)
and V is the number of unique
tokens (or vocabulary size).
Ht(w) = −(Pt(w) log2(Pt(w))) (4.2)
4.1.3.5 Interaction Graph Density
Another indicator for a moment’s impact is the number of users discussing the
moment. If many of these users are connected to each other through the social
network, however, just the number of users could be misleading. For instance, if
many of Justin Bieber’s followers all start tweeting about a single event, one could
see a major spike in this count even though little of interest may be happening in
the real world. One way to account for this potential bias is to weight a token
by the number of connections shared among the users using the token. Network
density captures this information by measuring the ratio between the number of
edges present in the network and the number of possible edges. While Twitter’s
friend/follower network is not captured in the data used here, one can instead build
a directed graph G from the interactions among these users where nodes V represent
users, and edges E represent retweet and mention interactions. To this end, this
model includes graph density as a feature, where density is calculated according to
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4.1.3.6 Term-Frequency, Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)
When building search engines, a standard measure for weighting terms is the TF-IDF
measure, which balances a token’s overall frequency by the number of documents
(or tweets here) in which it appears. It is included here as a standard feature from
the information retrieval community and is calculated as shown in Eq. 4.4 where
N is the number of tweets in the current window, and nw is the number of tweets
containing token w.
tfidf(w) = freq(w) · log N
nw
(4.4)
4.1.3.7 Term-Frequency, Proportional Document Frequency (TF-PDF)
TF-IDF purposely downweights tokens that appear in many documents, but this
construct may not be appropriate for detecting bursts in social media. A modi-
fied version of this measure, called TF-PDF, was proposed to capture this bursty
behavior by Khoo and Ishizuka and is included as a feature here [85, 87].
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4.1.3.8 BursT Score
In 2011, Lee, Wu, and Chien proposed a metric, called BursT, that tries to explicitly
capture a token’s bursty behavior by comparing actual arrival rates with expected
values [86]. In some sense, this metric could combine the average difference feature
and regression scores described above and is therefore included here as well.
4.1.4 Bursty Token Classification
The LABurst model differentiates between bursty and non-bursty tokens by inte-
grating these temporal features into feature vectors for each token. These vectors
are then processed using an ensemble classification algorithm of support vector ma-
chines (SVMs) [88] and random forests (RFs) [89].
Training these burst detection classifiers requires both positive and negative
samples of bursty tokens. For positive samples, one can identify high-impact events
and construct a set of seed tokens that should experience bursts along with these
events (as done in typical seed-based event detection approaches). Negative samples,
however, are difficult to identify since one cannot know all events occurring around
the world at a given moment. To address this difficulty, LABurst relies on a trick
of linguistics and uses stop words as negative samples, the justification being that
stop words are highly but consistently used (i.e., stop words are intrinsically non-
bursty). Therefore, LABurst is trained on a set of events with known bursty tokens
and stop words in both English and Spanish. This semi-supervised task also includes
a self-training phase to expand the list of bursty tokens.
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4.2 Evaluation Framework
LABurst was evaluated via two studies: the first compared LABurst’s accuracy in
discovering events to two baseline methods. The second experiment tested LABurst’s
domain independence by transferring models trained the sports context to the dis-
aster context.
4.2.1 Accuracy in Event Discovery
The first research question RQ1 was: Is LABurst’s accuracy in identifying key
moments competitive with simpler baseline algorithms? To answer this question,
an experiment was constructed for enumerating key moments during major sporting
competitions. Such competitions were interesting given their large followings (many
fans to post on social media), thorough coverage by sports journalists (high-quality
ground truth), and regular occurrence (large volume of data), making them ideal
for both data collection and evaluation. Target events were also complex in that
they include multiple types of events and unpredictable patterns of events around
scores, fouls, and other compelling moments of play.
Data was collected from a number of major sporting competitions, and several
key moments were identified in each competition. Moments and the times they
occurred were extracted from sports journalism articles, game highlights, box scores,
blog posts, and social media messages. Determining event times was a non-trivial
task, however, as the majority of sports coverage reported in-game times rather than
wall-clock times (e.g., World Cup goal times were reported relative to the game’s
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start). These journalistic sources then comprised the ground truth.
Once a testable data set was established, attention turned to the baseline
algorithms, the first of which was a time-series algorithm based on raw message
frequency. While results from the previous chapter suggested this algorithm would
perform poorly, this approach was popular enough in the literature to warrant in-
clusion. The second algorithm relied on domain knowledge and seed keywords like
those presented in Cipriani and Zhao et al. [14, 47]. Details on these baselines are
presented below.
4.2.1.1 Sporting Competitions
To minimize bias, these competitions covered several different sporting types, from
horse racing to the National Football League (NFL), to Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) premier league soccer, to the National Hockey League
(NHL), National Basketball Assoc. (NBA), and Major League Baseball (MLB).
Each competition also contained four basic types of events: beginning of the com-
petition, its end, scores, and penalties. Table 4.2 lists the events and the number of
key moments in each.
This data set tracked four Premier League games in November 2012. For the
2013 World Series between the Boston Red Sox and the St. Louis Cardinals, it
covered the final two games on 28 October and 30 October of 2013. In 2014, the
data set contained a subset of playoff games during the 2014 NHL Stanley Cup
and NBA playoffs and a number of early matches during stages 1 and 2 and the
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Table 4.2: Sporting Competition Data
Sport Key Moments
Training Data
2010 NFL Division Championship 13
2012 Premier League Soccer Games 21
2014 NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs 24
2014 NBA Playoffs 3
2014 Kentucky Derby Horse Race 3
2014 Belmont Stakes Horse Race 3
2014 FIFA World Cup Stages A+B 80
Testing Data
2013 MLB World Series Game 5 7
2013 MLB World Series Game 6 8
2014 NFL Super Bowl 13
2014 FIFA World Cup Third Place 11
2014 FIFA World Cup Final 7
Total 193
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the final two matches of 2014 World Cup. These final games included the 12 July
match between the Netherlands and Brazil for third place, and the match on 13
July between Germany and Argentina for first place.
These events were split into training and testing sets; training data covered
the 2010 NFL championship, 2012 premier league soccer games, NHL/NBA playoffs,
the Kentucky Derby/Belmont Stakes horse races, and several days of World Cup
matches in June of 2014. The testing data covered the 2013 MLB World Series,
2014 NFL Super Bowl, and the final two matches of the 2014 FIFA World Cup.
4.2.1.2 Burst Detection Baselines
The first baseline algorithm, referred to below as RawBurst, follows the “activity
peak detection” method presented in Lehmann et al. and a similar method presented
in Vasudevan et al. [45, 46]. RawBurst takes the difference between the number of
messages seen in the current time slice and the average number of messages seen
over the past k time slices.
Formally, a series of time slices t ∈ T is segmented into δ seconds and a social
media stream S containing messages m is defined such that St contains all messages
in the stream between t − 1 and t. The frequency of a given time slice t is then
defined freq(t, S) = |St| and the average over the past k time slices as avg(k, t, S),
shown in Eq. 4.5.





Given these functions, the difference between the frequency at time t and the average
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over the past k slices is defined as ∆t,k = freq(t, S)− avg(k, t, S). If this difference
exceeds a threshold ρ such that ∆t,k ≥ ρ, an event is detected at time t.
Following Cipriani from Twitter’s Developer Blog and others, RawBurst is
then modified to detect events using frequencies of a small set of seed tokens w ∈
W [14]. This domain-specific implementation is referred to as TokenBurst. To
convert RawBurst into TokenBurst, the freq(t, S) function is modified to return the
summed frequency of all seed tokens, as shown in Eq. 4.6 where count(w, St) returns
the frequency of token w in the stream S during time slice t. These seed tokens
are chosen such that they likely exhibit bursts in usage during the key moments
of sporting event data, such as “goal” for goals in soccer/football or hockey or
“run” for runs scored in baseball. This TokenBurst implementation also includes
some rudimentary normalization to collapse modified words to their originals (e.g.,
“gooaallll” down to “goal”). Many existing stream-based event detection systems





Since this analysis covers three separate types of sporting competitions, the
seed keyword set also includes tokens from each event. Separate keyword lists are
avoided to provide an even comparison to LABurst’s general nature. These seed
tokens are shown in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Predefined Seed Tokens
Sport Tokens
World Series run, home, homerun
Super Bowl score, touchdown, td, fieldgoal, points
World Cup goal, gol, golazo, score, foul, penalty, card, red, yellow, points
4.2.1.3 Evaluating Accuracy
LABurst, RawBurst, and TokenBurst were evaluated by constructing a series of
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves across test sets of the sports data.
These ROC curves were compared via their respective areas under the curves (AUCs),
generated by varying each method’s threshold parameters. The ROC AUC is useful
because it is robust against imbalanced classes, which one should expect given the
sparsity of high-impact events (i.e., important events are rare, and most of the time,
no major event has occurred).
In RawBurst and TokenBurst, the threshold parameters were ρ in ∆t,k ≥
ρ. For LABurst, the ROC curve was generated by varying the minimum ρ in
1̂E′(St, t) = |Bt| ≥ ρ.
4.2.2 Domain Independence
One of LABurst’s design goals is to discover and describe interesting moments re-
gardless of domain. RQ2 tests whether this goal was met by asking: Can LABurst
models trained in one context be transferred to another context and remain com-
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petitive?
Detecting key moments within sporting competitions is useful for advertis-
ing or automated highlight generation, but a more compelling task is to detect
higher-impact events like natural disasters. The typical seed-token-based approach
is difficult here as it is impossible to know what events are about to happen where,
and a list of target keywords to detect all such events would be long and lead to
false positives. LABurst could be beneficial here as one need not know details like
event location, language, or type. This context presents an opportunity to evaluate
LABurst in a new domain and compare it to existing work by Sakaki, Okazaki, and
Matsuo [17]. Thus, to answer RQ2, one can take the LABurst model as trained on
sporting events presented for RQ1 and apply them directly to this context.
For this earthquake detection task, LABurst was compared to the TokenBurst
baseline using the keyword “earthquake,” as in Sakaki, Okazaki, and Matsuo [17].
This evaluation used the two of the most severe earthquakes in Japan between 2014
and 2015: the 7.1-magnitude quake off the coast of Honshu, Japan on 25 October
2013, and a 6.5-magnitude quake off the coast of Iwaki, Japan on 11 July 2014.
Rather than generating ROC curves for this comparison, this evaluation compared
the lag between the earthquake event and the time in which the two methods de-
tected the earthquake. Ideally, this lag between TokenBurst and LABurst should
be small for RQ2 to be affirmed.
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4.3 Data Collection
Data for these evaluations was sourced from three Twitter corpora. The Edinburgh
Corpus [90] provided coverage of the 2010 NFL division championship game. A
second corpus was sourced from Twitter’s firehose source targeted at Argentina
during November of 2012, which covered the four Premier League soccer games.
All remaining data was extracted from Twitter’s 1% sample stream over the course
of October 2013 to July 2014. This public sample stream was connected to the
Twitter API endpoint without any filter, and retrieved approximately 4,000 tweets
per minute.
For each event (both sporting and earthquake), this analysis used all tweets
from the 1% stream starting an hour before the target event and ending an hour
after the event, yielding over 15 million tweets. Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of
tweets collected per event.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Setting Model Parameters
LABurst has several tunable parameters, and the following section discusses the
method and outcomes for setting these parameters. For LABurst’s slice size δ,
window size ω, and k previous window parameters, preliminary experimentation
yielded acceptable results with δ = 60 seconds, ω = 180 seconds, and k = 10. These
δ and k parameters were used in both RawBurst and TokenBurst as well.
67
Table 4.4: Per-Event Tweet Counts
Event Tweet Count
Training Data
2010 NFL Division Championship 109,809
2012 Premier League Soccer Games 1,064,040
2014 NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs 2,421,065
2014 NBA Playoffs 500,170
2014 Kentucky Derby Horse Race 233,172
2014 Belmont Stakes Horse Race 226,160
2014 FIFA World Cup Stages A+B 5,867,783
Testing Data
2013 MLB World Series Game 5 1,052,852
2013 MLB World Series Game 6 1,026,848
2013 Honshu Earthquake 444,018
2014 NFL Super Bowl 1,024,367
2014 FIFA World Cup Third Place 809,426
2014 FIFA World Cup Final 1,166,767
2014 Iwaki Earthquake 358,966
Total 16,305,443
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LABurst’s classifier implementations relied on the Scikit-learn2 package for
implementations of SVMs, RFs, and the ensemble classifier AdaBoost [91], each
of which also provided a number of hyperparameters. For SVMs, the primary hy-
perparameter is the type of kernel, either linear or higher order. The number of
features precluded a direct analysis of the decision plane between bursty and non-
burst tokens, so principal component analysis was used to reduce the data to a
three-dimensional space. Inspection of this reduced space showed a decision bound-
ary more consistent with a sphere rather than a clear linear plane. Therefore,
LABurst’s SVM implementation uses the radial basis function (RBF) kernel.
Remaining hyperparameters were determined via distributed parameter grid
searches for SVMs and RFs. The grid for SVM’s two parameters, cost c and kernel
coefficient γ, covered powers of two such that c, γ = 2x, x ∈ [−2, 10]. RF parameters
were similar for the number of estimators n and feature count c′ such that n = 2x,
x ∈ [0, 10] and c′ = 2y, y ∈ [1, 12].
Each parameter set was scored using the AUC metric across a randomly split
10-fold cross-validation set, with the best scores determining the parameters used
in the ensemble. The two classifiers were then combined via AdaBoost, yielding the
results shown in Table 4.5. These grid search results show RFs perform better than
SVMs, and the AdaBoost ensemble outperforms each individual classifier.
2http://scikit-learn.org/
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Table 4.5: Per-Classifier Hyperparameter Scores
Classifier Parameters ROC-AUC
SVM kernel = RBF, 87.48%
c = 64,
γ = 0.0625
RF trees = 1024, 88.35%
features = 2
AdaBoost estimators = 2 89.84%
4.4.2 Ablation Study
As with hyperparameters, LABurst can use different combinations of the features
presented earlier in this chapter, and each feature likely has different predictive
capability for this event detection task. To determine each feature’s utility, an
ablation study builds a set of models in which each feature is removed, and the
resulting classifiers are evaluated. These degenerate classifiers are then compared
with the full AdaBoost classifier using the same 10-fold cross-validation strategy
as above. Table 4.6 shows each model’s AUC and its difference with that of the
full model. These results suggest the regression and entropy features contribute the
most while the average difference features hinder performance.
4.4.3 Event Discovery Results
To refresh, (RQ1) asked whether LABurst performs as well as existing methods in
detecting key moments. Performance across RawBurst, TokenBurst, and LABurst
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Table 4.6: Ablation Study Results
Feature Sets ROC-AUC Difference
AdaBoost, All Features 89.84% –
Without Regression 87.79% -2.05
Without Entropy 87.94% -1.90
Without TF-IDF 88.85% -0.99
Without TF-PDF 89.00% -0.84
Without Density 89.07% -0.77
Without InterArrival 89.46% -0.38
Without BursT 89.52% -0.31
Without Average Difference 90.56% 0.72
in this task are presented below. These results also include a restricted version of
LABurst, called LABurst*, that is trained using the best features from the ablation
study (i.e., all features but average difference).
For the 2013 World Series, RawBurst’s AUC is 0.62, TokenBurst’s is 0.76,
LABurst achieves 0.73, and LABurst* yields 0.76. The two LABurst models clearly
dominate RawBurst and exhibit performance on par with TokenBurst. During the
Super Bowl, RawBurst and TokenBurst achieve an AUC of 0.68 and 0.78 respec-
tively, while LABurst and LABurst* perform worse with an AUC of 0.63 and 0.64.
During the 2014 World Cup, both LABurst and LABurst* (AUC = 0.72 and 0.73)
outperformed both RawBurst (AUC = 0.66) and TokenBurst (AUC = 0.64).
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RawBurst ROC (area = 0.62)
TokenBurst ROC (area = 0.76)
LABurst ROC (area = 0.73)
LABurst* ROC (area = 0.76)
(a) 2013 World Series




















RawBurst ROC (area = 0.68)
TokenBurst ROC (area = 0.78)
LABurst ROC (area = 0.63)
LABurst* ROC (area = 0.64)
(b) 2014 Super Bowl




















RawBurst ROC (area = 0.66)
TokenBurst ROC (area = 0.64)
LABurst ROC (area = 0.72)
LABurst* ROC (area = 0.73)
(c) 2014 World Cup
Figure 4.1: Per-Sport ROC Curves
4.4.4 Composite Results
Figure 4.2 shows comprehensive performance, which shows ROC curves for all three
methods across all three testing events. The blue and green lines showing the ROC
curves for RawBurst and TokenBurst respectively. The red line shows the ROC curve
for the LABurst model trained using all features, and the black line shows LABurst*.
From this figure, LABurst (AUC=0.7) and LABurst* (AUC=0.71) both outperform
72




















RawBurst ROC (area = 0.65)
TokenBurst ROC (area = 0.72)
LABurst ROC (area = 0.70)
LABurst* ROC (area = 0.71)
Figure 4.2: Composite ROC Curves
RawBurst (AUC=0.65) and perform nearly as well as TokenBurst (AUC=0.72).
Given these results, one can answer RQ1 in that, yes, LABurst is competitive with
existing methods.
Assuming equal cost for false positives and negatives and optimizing for the
largest difference between true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR),
TokenBurst shows a TPR of 0.56 and FPR of 0.14 with a difference of 0.42 at
a threshold value of 13.2. LABurst, on the other hand, has a TPR of 0.64 and
FPR of 0.28 with a difference of 0.36 at a threshold value of 2. From these values,
LABurst achieves a higher true positive rate at the cost of a higher false positive
rate. This effect is possibly explained by the domain-specific nature of the test set
and TokenBurst implementation, as discussed in more detail in Section 4.5.3.
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(a) Honshu Earthquake - 25 October 2013 (b) Iwaki Earthquake - 11 July 2014
Figure 4.3: Japanese Earthquake Detection
4.4.5 Earthquake Detection
RQ2 asks whether adapting LABurst’s sports models can compete with existing
techniques across domains. To this end, the top-performing LABurst model from
the previous section was also applied to Twitter data surrounding known earth-
quake events in Japan in 2013 and 2014. For comparison, the TokenBurst algorithm
provided a baseline using the token “earthquake” as in Sakaki et al. [17].
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show the detection curves for both methods for the 2013
and 2014 earthquakes respectively; the red dots indicate the earthquake times as
reported by the United States Geological Survey. The left vertical axis for each
figure reports the frequency of the “earthquake” token, and the right axis shows
the number of tokens classified as bursty by LABurst. From the TokenBurst curve,
one can see the token “earthquake” sees a significant increase in usage when the
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earthquake occurs, and LABurst experiences a similar increase simultaneously. It is
worth noting that LABurst exhibits bursts prior to the earthquake event, but these
peaks are unrelated to the earthquake event since LABurst does not differentiate
between the earthquake and other high-impact events that could be happening on
Twitter. In addition, the peak occurring about 50 minutes after the earthquake on
25 October 2013 is consistent with an aftershock event3. Given the minimal lag
between LABurst and TokenBurst’s detection, LABurst is shown to be effective in
cross-domain event discovery (RQ2).
One can now ask what tokens were identified as bursting when the earthquakes
occurred. Table 4.7 presents tokens extracted using LABurst. For additional con-
text, several tweets containing these bursty tokens were extracted from Twitter as
well: “地震だあああああああああああああああああああああ,” “今回はチ
ト使ってないから地震わからなかった,” and “地震だ .” Google Translate4
translates these tweets as “Ah ah ah ah ah ah ah ah ah Aa’s earthquake,” “I did
not know earthquake because not using cheat this time,” and “Over’s earthquake”
respectively.
Table 4.7: Discovered Bursty Tokens
Earthquake Bursty Tokens
Honshu, Japan – 25 October 2013 ç 丈, 地, 夫, 怖, 波, 注, 津, 源, 福, 震





In comparing LABurst with the baseline techniques, it is important to note the
strengths and weaknesses of each baseline: RawBurst requires no prior information
but provides little in the way of semantic information regarding detected events,
while TokenBurst provides this semantic information at the cost of missing unknown
tokens or significant events that do not conform to its prior knowledge. LABurst
attempts to combine these two approaches by supporting undirected event discovery
while yielding insight into these moments by tagging relevant bursting tokens.
4.5.1 Identifying Event-Related Tokens
As mentioned, where the baselines sacrifice either insight or flexibility, LABurst
jointly attacks these problems and produces event-related tokens automatically.
These tokens may include misspellings, colloquialisms, and language-crossing to-
kens, which makes them hard to know a priori. The 2014 World Cup provides an
illustrative case for such unexpected tokens given its enormous viewership: many
Twitter users of many different languages are likely tweeting about the same event.
Table 4.8 shows a selection of events from the final two World Cup matches and
a subset of those tokens classified as bursting during the events (the list is not
exhaustive).
Several interesting artifacts emerge from this table, first of which is that one
can get an immediate sense of what happened in the detected moment from to-
kens presented. For instance, the prevalence of the token “goal” and its variations
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Table 4.8: Tokens Classified as Busting During Events
Match Event Bursty Tokens
Brazil v. Netherlands, 12
July 2014
Netherlands’ Van Persie scores a
goal on a penalty at 3’, 1-0
0-1, 1-0, 1:0, 1x0, card,
goaaaaaaal, goal, gol, goool,
holandaaaa, kırmızı, pen, penal,
penalti, pênalti, persie, red
Brazil v. Netherlands, 12
July 2014
Brazil’s Oscar get’s a yellow card
at 68’
dive, juiz, penalty, ref
Germany v. Argentina,
13 July 2014
Germany’s Götze scores a goal at
113’, 1-0
goaaaaallllllll, goalllll, godammit,
goetze, gollllll, gooooool, gotze,
gotzeeee, götze, nooo, yessss, ド
イツ
clearly indicate a team scored in the first and third events in Table 4.8; similarly,
bursting tokens associated with the middle event regarding Oscar’s yellow card re-
flect his penalty for diving. Beyond the pseudo event description put forth by the
identified tokens, references to diving and specific player/team names in the first
and third events are also of significant interest. In the first event, one can infer
that the Netherlands scored since “holandaaaa” is flagged along with “persie” for
the Netherlands’ player, Van Persie, and likewise for Germany’s Götze in the third
event (and the accompanying variations of his name). These tokens would be dif-
ficult to capture beforehand as TokenBurst would require, and such tokens would
likely not be related to every event or every type of sporting event.
Finally, the last artifact of note is that the set of bursty tokens displayed
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includes tokens from several different languages: English for “goal” and “penalty,”
Spanish for “gol” and “penal,” Brazilian Portuguese for “juiz” (meaning “referee”),
as well as the Arabic for “goal” and Japanese for “Germany.” Since these words are
semantically similar but syntactically distinct, typical normalization schemes could
not capture these connections. Instead, capturing these words in the baseline would
require a pre-specified keyword list in all possible languages or a machine translation
system capable of normalizing within different languages.
4.5.2 Discovering Unanticipated Moments
Results show LABurst is competitive with the domain-specific TokenBurst, but
TokenBurst’s specificity makes it unable to detect unanticipated moments, and one
can see instances of such omissions in the last game of World Cup. Figure 4.4 shows
target token frequencies for TokenBurst in green and LABurst’s volume of bursty
tokens in red. This graph shows several instances where LABurst exhibits a peak
that is missed by TokenBurst. The first, peak #1, includes tokens “puyol,” “gisele,”
and “bundchen,” which correspond to former Spanish player Carles Puyol and model
Gisele Bundchen, who presented the World Cup trophy prior to the match. While
not necessarily a sports-related event, many viewers were interested in the trophy
reveal, making it a key moment. At peak #2, slightly more than eighty minutes
into the data (which is sixty minutes into the match), LABurst sees another peak
otherwise inconspicuous in the TokenBurst curve. Upon further exploration, tokens
present in this peak refer to Argentina’s substituting Agüero for Lavezzi at the
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Figure 4.4: Baseline and LABurst Frequencies
beginning of the match’s second half.
4.5.3 Addressing the Super Bowl
While LABurst performs as well as the domain-specific TokenBurst algorithm in
both the World Series and World Cup events, one cannot ignore its poor perfor-
mance during the Super Bowl. Since LABurst is both language agnostic and do-
main independent, it likely detects additional high-impact events outside of the game
start/end, score, and penalty events present in the experiment’s ground truth. For
instance, during the Super Bowl, spectators tweet about moments beyond sports
plays: they tweet about the half-time show, commercials, and massive power out-
ages. Since our ground truth disregards such moments, LABurst’s higher false-
positive rate is less surprising, and TokenBurst’s superior performance might result
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from its specificity in domain knowledge with respect to the ground truth (i.e.,
both include only sports data). Hence, LABurst’s ability to detect unanticipated
moments potentially penalizes it in domain-specific tasks.
LABurst’s propensity towards more organic moments of interest becomes obvi-
ous when one inspects the tokens LABurst identified when it detected a large burst
early on that TokenBurst missed. Approximately four minutes before the game
started (and therefore before when TokenBurst would detect any event), LABurst
saw a large burst with tokens like “joe”, “namath”, “fur”, “coat”, “pimp”, “jacket”,
“coin”, and “toss”. As it turns out, Joe Namath, a retired American football player,
garnered significant attention from fans when he tossed the coin to decide which team
would get first possession. Since neither the ground truth data nor TokenBurst’s
domain knowledge captured this moment, LABurst’s detection is counted as a false
positive much like the trophy presentation during the World Cup.
4.6 Limitations and Extensions
The approach adopted herein is fundamentally limited regarding tracking potentially
interesting events that do not garner mass awareness on social media. Since LABurst
presupposes significant bursts in activity during key moments, if only a few people
are participating in or following an event, LABurst will be unable to detect moments
in that event. This effect is clear in applying LABurst to regular season baseball
games: Major League Baseball sees over 2,400 games in a season, and experiments
showed too few viewers were posting messages to Twitter during these games to
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generate any significant burst. As a result, many key moments in these games were
exceedingly difficult to capture via burst detection.
This deficiency leads to a potential opportunity in combining domain knowl-
edge with LABurst’s domain-agnostic foundations. For example, one could ap-
ply domain-specific filters to the Twitter stream prior to LABurst in the detection
pipeline. Since LABurst uses relative frequencies to identify bursts, this pre-filtering
step should amplify the signal of potentially bursty tokens in the stream and increase
LABurst’s likelihood of detecting them. Returning to the baseball example, one
could use domain information to filter the Twitter stream to contain only relevant
tweets, and the baseball-specific key moments should become more apparent. The
following chapter explores this possibility in real-time interest tracking.
4.7 Conclusions
Revisiting motivations, this research sought to demonstrate whether LABurst, a
streaming, language-agnostic, burst-centric algorithm, can discover key moments
from unfiltered social media streams (specifically Twitter’s public sample stream).
Results show temporal features can identify bursty tokens and, using the volume of
these tokens as an indicator, one can discover key moments across a collection of
disparate sporting competitions. This approach’s performance is competitive with
existing baselines. Furthermore, these sports-trained models are adaptable to other
domains with a level of performance exceeding a simple time series baseline and
rivaling a domain-specific method. LABurst’s performance relative to the domain-
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specific baseline shows this method’s potential given its omission of manual keyword
selection and prior knowledge.
Beyond this comparison, this approach also offers notable flexibility in identify-
ing bursting tokens across language boundaries and in supporting event description;
that is, one can get a sense of the occurring event by inspecting bursty tokens re-
turned by LABurst. These features combine to form a capable tool for discovering
unanticipated moments of high interest, regardless of language. This technique is
particularly useful for journalists and first responders, who have a vested interest
in rapidly identifying and understanding high-impact moments, even if a journalist
or aid worker is not physically present to observe the event. Possibilities also ex-
ist to combine LABurst with other domain-specific solutions and yield insight into
unanticipated events, events missed by existing approaches, or events that might
otherwise be lost in the noise.
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Chapter 5: Real-Time Event Discovery
One of social media’s most significant powers is the rapidity with which new in-
formation is shared. With recent events showing social media to be a major news
source, methods for discovering and summarizing events from this deluge of data in
real time are increasingly important. The previous chapter set the foundations for
this task in social media streams, and this chapter extends this work to the real-time
context with the RTTBurst algorithm, a streamlined version of LABurst.
At the same time, once an event is discovered, a user needs methods for track-
ing new developments in those events over time. Currently, if the user wants to
track important events or topics in these data streams, she must remain at her
computer and manually filter through potentially many duplicate posts to track the
event. The previous chapter suggests LABurst could be modified to track partic-
ular topics of interest, and to this end, this chapter explores topic-directed event
discovery/summarization and its performance in the 2015 NIST TREC Microblogs
Track [92].
This chapter’s thesis is that RTTBurst, through regression analysis across in-
dividual token frequencies, can identify high-impact and new information in social
media streams in real time and improve classical information retrieval. The follow-
83
ing sections detail RTTBurst’s mechanics, the steps needed to construct a system
capable of processing Twitter’s 1% stream in real time, and how RTTBurst tracks
developments in a particular topic. Following RTTBurst’s mechanics is a discus-
sion on tuning RTTBurst given data from TREC’s 2015 Microblog track, relative
performance between RTTBurst and other systems participating in this track, and
methods for integrating RTTBurst with other systems. While the previous chapter
focused heavily on the open-domain context, evaluating such an undirected system
is difficult given the unbounded number of high-impact events that could occur in
any given time period. While RTTBurst’s construction as described here is eas-
ily applied to these open-domain streams, this chapter focuses on content streams
relevant to a pre-defined set of user interests to facilitate evaluation.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• Presents a real-time streaming algorithm, RTTBurst, for discovering and sum-
marizing relevant moments on Twitter,
• Details RTTBurst’s performance relative to similar real-time systems, and
• Demonstrates that burst detection can enhance real-time tracking systems.
5.1 Real-Time Extensions
The LABurst algorithm presented in the previous chapter is designed for data
streams, but several features used LABurst are poorly applicable to real-time pro-
cessing. Network density, for example, does not directly lend itself to streaming
computation as the underlying data structure would require modification at each
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time step. As shown in the previous chapter, LABurst’s most important feature
is regression based on a token’s frequency. These factors necessitate a streamlined
implementation of the burst detection strategy employed by LABurst, which is pre-
sented at RTTBurst (for Real-Time Temporal Burst). Furthermore, LABurst’s
codebase was not designed for distributed computation; RTTBurst, on the other
hand, leverages a new platform in distributed computing: Apache Spark1, which is
built on Apache’s Hadoop platform2.
At a high level, RTTBurst uses only one feature as a scoring mechanism: the
same linear regression feature described in Chapter 4. As with LABurst, RTTBurst
generates per-token frequency vectors for each token in Twitter’s 1% stream, where
each vector element is the token’s frequency in a sliding window. This frequency
data is fit to an exponential curve by taking the natural logarithm of each fre-
quency and uses linear regression to calculate the curve’s slop and fit. Tokens with
steep slopes exhibit exponential increases in frequency and are therefore tagged as
“bursty.” While LABurst used only the number of bursty tokens to identify high-
impact events, RTTBurst extracts tweets that contain these bursty tokens as a
means for moment summarization similar to Chakrabarti and Punera [93].
RTTBurst’s pipeline is composed of several stages, from collecting the Twitter
stream, to finding bursty tokens, to using these tokens to extract the most interesting




5.1.1 Processing the Twitter Stream
For input, RTTBurst uses Twitter’s unfiltered public sample stream, corresponding
to approximately 1% of the full stream (though larger samples should also work),
as provided by Spark’s built-in Twitter receiver. Each tweet is then tokenized to
extract individual keywords and build quality metrics. Previous results show a
large amount of spam in Twitter, so RTTBurst includes a series of filters to remove
“low-quality” tweets based on the number of hashtags, web links, token counts, and
whether the tweet contained the string “follow” (motivated by the large amount of
“follow-me” spam on Twitter). Each of these thresholds are tunable as well.
After this round of quality-based pruning, web links and hashtags are extracted
from each tweet, and the tweet is tokenized by replacing remaining punctuation with
whitespace and splitting on white space to create a bag-of-words model. Each tweet’s
bag-of-words is then converted into a time-stamped inverted index matching tokens
to the users who tweeted them. User-based frequency is used here rather than raw
token frequency based on empirical results from the previous chapter.
5.1.2 Identifying Bursty Tokens
This time-stamped inverted index captures changes in a token’s usage over time.
RTTBurst maintains a sliding window over all tweets generated by the Twitter
streaming API within the past two minutes and increments the window by 60-
second time slices. Each window therefore overlaps with the previous 60 seconds to
smooth the input.
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For each two-minute window, RTTBurst calculates the number of users tweet-
ing each token and stores this frequency over the previous N windows. These
frequencies are normalized by the number of unique tokens in the past N windows
using add-one additive smoothing to correct for tokens with zero occurrences in
a single window. Following the features set forth in Chapter 4, linear regression is
then used to fit a line to the natural logarithm of this frequency data. By transform-
ing this frequency data to logarithmic space, exponential curves will appear linear,
simplifying the linear regression step, and the steeper the slope of the best-fit line,
the steeper the exponential growth of the token’s usage. Based on this fit, tokens
are then scored by the product of the slope of the best-fit line and its coefficient of
determination R2. Since R2 coefficient is in the range [0, 1], this product reduces
scores for highly deviant frequency curves. In this manner, tokens experiencing large
bursts in usage, which one would expect to exhibit exponential growth, are scored
highly. All tokens with scores below a burst threshold γ and any token whose length
is less than four characters are discarded.
5.1.3 Moment Summarization
Every sixty seconds, RTTBurst identifies a new (possibly empty) set of bursty
tokens, which corresponds to noteworthy moments in the stream. Some context
around the moment is lost with only bursty tokens, however, so RTTBurst also
finds social media messages that contain the largest number of bursty tokens and
returns those as summarizations, similar to the ReDites system [51].
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To this end, every sixty seconds, RTTBurst parses all tweets in the previous N
windows to create a subset of tweets containing these bursty tokens. To ensure each
summary messages adds new information about the moment, RTTBurst calculates
a Jaccard similarity score for each message by comparing it to messages returned in
previous windows. Any new message whose Jaccard similarity is above a threshold
Jt = 0.7 is discarded, and the remaining Twitter messages are sorted by their
similarity scores in decreasing order. Finally, the top M most unique messages
containing bursty tokens from the past N windows are returned as summaries for
this moment.
5.2 Real-Time Topic Tracking
Adding topic tracking to RTTBurst requires additional capabilities for expanding
user-provided queries and filtering results. These extensions are also designed ac-
cording to the specifications presented in the TREC 2015 Microblog track [92].
5.2.1 Query Construction and Expansion
In principle, RTTBurst could track a given topic using a small set of seed keywords,
but the dynamic nature of Twitter’s vocabulary implies such an approach would
miss relevant data. To account for this possibility, RTTBurst includes a methods
for expanding a user’s query based on its structure and social media data.
This query construction comprises a filtering task, whose goal is to identify
tweets relevant to a given set of user interests, described by a few keywords. These
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queries are referred to as “interest profiles.”
For each interest profile, RTTBurst constructs a query by first removing stop
words and then lemmatizing the remaining keywords to get a cleaner keyword set
for filtering. As an example, RTTBurst would ingest the profile, “arson fires in inner
cities,” and produce the following tokens for filtering: “arson,” “fire,” “inner,” and
“city.”
Once this initial keyword set is constructed, RTTBurst uses them to construct
a set of relevant tweets from the previous few weeks of Twitter data. This subset
of tweets is then used to build a model of keyword distributions in this set, which
constitutes a foreground model for the next stage of analysis. This next stage uses
Kullback-Leibler divergence to compare this foreground model against the unfiltered
Twitter data set (i.e., the background model). Each keyword in the foreground
model is scored based on its deviation from the background, such that keywords
that are more common in the foreground than the background model receive higher
scores. The top five most divergent keywords are then added to the set of query
keywords for further filtering.
5.2.2 Filtering the Twitter Sample Stream
After constructing a set of query keywords, RTTBurst applies this set to the in-
coming, unfiltered Twitter sample stream. Since RTTBurst already tokenizes each
tweet, the filtering stage here calculates the intersection between each tweet’s token
set and the set of all search keywords. Each tweet with a non-empty intersection set
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(i.e., only those tweets that contained at least one keyword from a user’s interest
profile) is kept for further processing. It is important to note that, while RTTBurst
does remove irrelevant tweets by matching tokens from interest profiles, this filtering
step occurrs after ingesting tweets from Twitter’s unfiltered sample stream. These
tokenized tweets are then converted into a time-stamped inverted index as before,
and RTTBurst’s processing proceeds as described in the previous section.
5.2.3 Topic-Specific Summarization
In the unfiltered version of RTTBurst, moment summarization ensures dissimilarity
in tweets and records all sufficiently unique tweets. For topic-specific summarization,
however, RTTBurst performs one last pass through the tweets to select those that
were most relevant to the given interest profile. For each candidate tweet stored up
to this point, RTTBurst selects only those tweets that contain at least X tokens
from the relevant interest profile. All other tweets are discarded.
5.3 Evaluating Real-Time Topic Tracking
RTTBurst was originally developed as an open-domain model and was adapted to
the interest tracking domain for the TREC 2015 Microblog track, which focused
on identifying new, topically relevant information on Twitter in real time. As men-
tioned in the track’s 2015 overview paper [92], this filtering task’s goal was to identify
new tweets relevant to a set of given interest profiles. The evaluation occurred in
July of 2015 over ten days and was broken across two tasks: a push notification task
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that enforced a limit of 10 tweets per interest profile per day and penalized tweets
based on the delay between posting and reporting (Scenario A), and a daily email
digest task with the relaxed constraint of 100 messages per day and no temporal
penalty (Scenario B).
Each tweet returned across all systems were assigned a “qrel” score (for query
relevance) by NIST evaluators according to the relevance that tweet had to the
interest profile it matched: either “not relevant,” “relevant,” or “highly relevant” (a
score of 0, 1, or 2 respectively). Qrel judgements for retweets were then propagated
to their source tweets, and all retweets of this source tweet received the same qrel
score. For Scenario A, the mobile notification task, each system was scored based
on this relevance score and by how rapidly the system was able to push that tweet
to the user. As described in the Microblog Track overview [92], the two Scenario A
evaluation metrics were expected latency-discounted gain (ELG), shown in Eq. 5.1,
where N is the count of returned tweets, and G(t) is each tweet’s gain. A tweet’s
gain was defined by the relevance score assigned to the tweet by NIST evaluators:
0 if the tweet was not relevant, 0.5 if the tweet was relevant, and 1 if the tweet was
highly relevant. This ELG score also received a penalty for latency, such that a tweet
received 100 minutes after its creation time received no score. Otherwise, each tweet
is penalized according to MAX(0, (100− d)/100) to model user fatigue in receiving
many updates, where d is the number of minutes between a tweet’s publication
time and it is delivered to the user. Along this same line, Scenario A imposed a
limit of no more than ten tweets per topic per day; any additional tweets were not
scored. Scenario A also had a second scoring mechanism, normalized cumulative
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Scenario B’s daily email digest task was similar to Scenario A but relaxed
the per-day limit to one hundred tweets and scored systems based on normalized
discounted cumulative gain (nDCG) for the top ten ranks (nDCG@10), a standard
scoring metric for recommender systems.
Prior to the July evaluation period, NIST created a set of 225 topics for evalu-
ation. Of these topics, NIST assessors reviewed tweets returned for 51 of the topics
for relevance, resulting in a set of 94,066 scored tweets.
5.4 NIST Evaluation Results
RTTBurst’s TREC 2015 evaluation version lacked tweet quality metrics (i.e., it did
not filter tweets with many hashtags, many links, or few tokens) and tweet similar-
ity methods to prevent duplicate tweets from being reported. For example, while
the original RTTBurst implementation did prevent the same tweet ID from being
reported twice, two different tweets with the same content could still be reported,
and many Twitter bots spammed the same tweet content with only slight differences
(one token at the end of the tweet might differ from one spam tweet to the next).
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This official run motivated these quality metrics as RTTBurst reported a significant
amount of spam in this early run.
Following the TREC evaluation period and the release of the NIST-judged
tweets, these quality metrics were implemented along with a series of post hoc
parameter optimization experiments. This optimization used a randomized param-
eter search over window size N ∈ [7, 43], maximum tweets delivered per minute
N ∈ [10, 50], and burst thresholds γ ∈ [0.015, 0.18]. The range for γ was determined
from an early study that calculated mean and maximum token scores for the two
weeks prior to evaluation run. For each parameter set, the number of tweets RT-
TBurst delivered to the user (across all topics), the number of these tweets that did
not have associated relevance judgments from NIST (unjudged tweets), and their
scores were recorded.
Table 5.1 shows the top-scoring sets for both scenarios from the official run
(indicated by the †) and post hoc parameter optimization. Official scores placed
RTTBurst 11th out of 32 automatic runs in Scenario A (ranked by ELG) and 4th
out of 38 in Scenario B. After parameter optimization, RTTBurst would move up one
rank in Scenario A and would remain in fourth in Scenario B. Note that randomized
parameter optimization produced more scored tweets than the official run, which was
almost silent. It is worthwhile to note that RTTBurst was exceedingly conservative
in the emission of tweets, and that this approach occupies a different point in the
tradeoff space compared to standard retrieval-based systems.
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Table 5.1: Optimized Parameters, Tweets Delivered to Users, and Scores (Best in Bold)


















† 30 10 0.07 1 0 0.2471 0.2471 1 0 0.2471
37 13 0.036854 29 15 0.2549 0.2464 29 15 0.2420
18 34 0.138824 15 7 0.2525 0.2494 15 7 0.2479
37 48 0.067306 6 1 0.2506 0.2479 6 1 0.2489
† – Parameters used for TREC 2015 evaluation
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5.5 Ensembles with RTTBurst
While analyzing results after the official TREC 2015 evaluation, a significant dissim-
ilarity between the tweets returned by RTTBurst and those returned by the other
systems became apparent. This observation led to a question: If RTTBurst’s burst
detection approach were applied to the output of a traditional information retrieval
system, could this traditional system’s performance be improved? To explore this
possibility, a simple gating mechanism was implemented such that, given a set of
tweets returned by system A, RTTBurst only allowed those tweets containing a
bursty token to be reported (i.e., tweets without bursty tokens were not allowed
through the gate).
In addition, to evaluate further the ensembles of RTTBurst gating any given
system, additional ensembles were implemented using all possible pairs of systems
submitted to the Microblog track. For this investigation, an ensemble system took
the union of any two systems’ returned tweets and then applied RTTBurst’s gating
mechanism to filter the results. To ensure that RTTBurst did not benefit from
simply combining multiple systems, this experiment scored the outputs of each pair
of systems with and without RTTBurst gating. Duplicate tweets were removed from
this paired output, the output was ordered by delivery time, and ensembles that
delivered more tweets than scenario limits allowed were truncated to the appropriate
size.
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(a) Single System vs. Gated System











(b) Single System vs. Paired, Gated System
Figure 5.1: Performance Differences in ELG. Systems arranged alphabetically.
5.5.1 Gating with RTTBurst
Applying RTTBurst’s gating mechanism to a single Scenario A system resulted in
an average increase in ELG and nCG by 17% and 13% respectively but decreased
the ELG of the best-performing system (presented by Tan et al. [94]) by about 19%.
A two-sided Welch’s t-test on the original scores and the gated scores determined
this increase in ELG was statistically significant (t(33) = 3.28, p < 0.01). In total,
RTTBurst increased the performance of 22 systems and decreased the performance
of 13 systems, as shown in Figure 5.1a. For Scenario B, gating with RTTBurst
resulted in a 9% decrease in nDCG@10.
For system pairs, comparing an individual system with its highest-scoring pair
(that is, comparing it to all other systems and taking the pair that achieves the
highest ELG) yielded an 11% average ELG increase. Only three systems achieved
higher scores without pairing. Using RTTBurst to gate these pairs yielded a 24%
increase in ELG over the individual, ungated systems, and five systems performed
worse than their unpaired, ungated counterparts. Differences in single system ELG
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(a) Best Pair vs. Silent System














(b) Best Gated Pair vs. Silent System
Figure 5.2: Average ELG vs. Silent System (systems arranged alphabetically)
and paired, gated system scores are shown in Figure 5.1b.
For completeness, a comparison was also made between the best pairs’ ELG
and a silent system (Figure 5.2a) and the best gated pairs of systems (Figure 5.2b).
Note these figures show absolute scores rather than score differences. The best pairs
of systems did not perform as well as a silent system, but applying RTTBurst as an
additional gating filter raised all pairs up to or above the score for a silent system.
5.6 Observations on RTTBurst and Ensembles
Experimental results and data from the official Microblog track exhibited a nega-
tive correlation between scores and reported tweets (i.e., systems returning fewer
tweets scored higher). This link was first apparent given the score for a system that
returned no tweets at all: an ELG, nCG, and nDCG@10 of 0.2471, which placed
in the upper third of rankings in both TREC scenarios. During RTTBurst’s pa-
rameter optimization experiments, this trend became more evident in a strongly
negative, nearly linear correlation (R2 = 0.8172) between the number of tweets RT-
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TBurst returned and the TREC score produced. This preference towards silence
could explain why gating with RTTBurst increased the average score in Scenario A:
Summed across all topics, gating reduced the average number of tweets delivered by
two orders of magnitude (from 1,600 tweets to 57).
Such a significant reduction in the number of delivered tweets suggested an-
other issue regarding similarity of results returned by the original systems and their
gated counterparts. From Figure 5.2, all systems’ scores tended to converge to the
same value; this convergence would be easily explained if all gated systems were
converging to the same set of tweets. By calculating the Jaccard similarity among
the returned tweets for each system and then among the gated systems, however,
one could determine whether all systems were converging on the same set: For the
original systems, the average similarity across all systems was 0.045, and for the
gated systems, average similarity was 0.55. Therefore, gains made from gating with
RTTBurst were not the result of reducing all output to a common set of tweets.
This result suggests burst analysis did provide a valuable relevance signal.
While this convergence is a positive effect for many systems, one must address
why RTTBurst decreases the top performing run by Tan et al. [94] by 19%. One
possibility is the absence of more sophisticated query expansion techniques. RTT-
Burst therefore potentially discards many relevant tweets, something that future
versions of the system should address.
A further limitation is the potential imbalance in the “bursty-ness” of some
topics; thresholds for bursts about celebrities may be too high for more esoteric
topics. In its current form, RTTBurst maintains a single burst threshold value
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across all topics, which made sense for its original open-domain event detection
goal. For tracking specific topics as in TREC’s Microblog task, however, thresholds
for different topics may vary widely, necessitating separate thresholds for each topic,
and some topics may not exhibit bursts at all. Analysis of the posting patterns in
tweets scored as relevant in the 2015 TREC evaluation support both possibilities;
Figure 5.3 is a bar graph representing the frequency of relevant tweets in logarithmic
scale per topic per day in the 2015 evaluation period. The graphs are normalized
by the global maximum frequency across all topics and show relatively few topics
exhibiting bursts in activity (e.g., topic #243, 348, and 401), with most topics
having little difference in day-to-day activity. Normalizing these relevant tweet
frequencies by the per-topic maximum instead of the maximum across all topics,
however, yields a potentially different view, as shown in Figure 5.4. The red bars
in the graphs identify days where relevant tweet frequency exceed three times the
MAD, suggesting a burst in activity. Normalizing based on the per-topic frequency
is difficult since one does not know the a topic’s scale a priori.
This work is also limited by including unjudged tweets in the returned tweet
sets, which makes a true performance comparison between official and post hoc
runs difficult. That is, while the NIST assessors provided relevance judgments for
approximately 94k tweets, the Twitter sample stream over the TREC evaluation
period contains around 40 million tweets, so it is highly likely post hoc runs of
RTTBurst may return tweets without these judgments. This limitation may be the

































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.4: Daily Relevant Tweet Frequency Per Topic, Per-Topic Normalization –
Red bars exceed three times the MAD
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5.7 Conclusions
This chapter extends Chapter 4’s language-agnostic burst detection algorithm to the
real-time context with RTTBurst, a streamlined implementation of LABurst built
on the Apache Spark distributed platform. RTTBurst’s real-time topic tracking per-
formance is shown to be competitive with state-of-the-art systems at the TREC 2015
Microblog track. These results demonstrate RTTBurst’s regression-based method is
effective at identifying new and topical information from social media streams like
Twitter in real-time. Furthermore, RTTBurst represents a fundamentally different
approach to real-time topic tracking and summarization, with results for combining
RTTBurst with other TREC systems yielding improved performance. Given RT-
TBurst’s simple model and its stream-oriented processing, it is at least a useful tool
for standalone operation and can be easily integrated into other approaches.
Placing these results in the larger frame of this dissertation, RTTBurst pro-
vides a platform for real-time event discovery. It integrates insights from the Twit-
ter’s response to terrorism by focusing on topical bursts and merges LABurst’s
most predictive features for event discovery into a single, end-to-end system. By
producing tweet-based event summaries, RTTBurst also provides a starting point
for tracking threads of conversation through retweeting and other sharing behav-
iors, which can be directly leveraged for credibility analysis, as will be shown in the
following chapter.
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Chapter 6: Evaluating Truth in Social Media
Determining the degree of trust one should place in others (whether human or elec-
tronic, spoken or written, individual or group) has been an important strategic
decision for as long as humans have lived and worked in communities. Increas-
ing reliance on social media as a journalistic source, both by journalists and read-
ers [24, 95], and recent examples where trust in these sources was misplaced (e.g.,
misinformation during the 2010 Chilean earthquake [8, 66], 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing [3, 33, 96], and others) demonstrate the need for mechanisms to evaluate
trust in these sources. This problem is exacerbated by social media’s high velocity
where traditionally trustworthy entities like major news organizations or well-known
journalists disseminate incorrect information to satisfy users’ hunger for rapid up-
dates. When first responders, disaster response agencies, and automated systems
rely on this information, incorrectly trusting inaccurate content can have real-world
impacts.
To address these issues, this chapter investigates truth and credibility in Twit-
ter streams. Disentangling these factors is difficult, however, since the review Chap-
ter 2 shows truth, credibility, and trust are highly nuanced characteristics of infor-
mation and information sources. This chapter therefore operationalizes “truth” as
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accuracy/veracity, or whether a story conforms to facts. Credibility is then defined
as the perception of truth, or believability, of a story [56]. One should note, while
these terms are connected, a true story may not necessarily imply that the story is
credible, and a credible story may not necessarily be true.
Following from these definitions, this chapter focuses on evaluating content
rather than assessing the accounts posting this content. Content takes the form of
threads of conversation in Twitter. One can then analyze the structure present in
these threads’ networks, textual content, and user features to develop algorithms to
determine accuracy and credibility.
Such assessments could be useful to a variety of users and organizations, from
first responders looking to allocate resources to journalists looking for accurate in-
formation to share with the general public. The goal in this chapter is to develop
algorithms that can rapidly assess accuracy to support decision making.
Researchers are working to address these issues in a variety of ways [7–11].
Two recently published, publicly available data sets explicitly address accuracy in
social media: the CREDBANK data set [97], and the PHEME rumour scheme data
set [98, 99]. This chapter leverages these two data sets to first develop algorithms
assessing accuracy in Twitter streams and then explores the connection between
accuracy and credibility in this context.
This work makes the following contributions:
• Presents a set of features for evaluating accuracy of conversations in Twitter
streams,
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• Evaluates the utility of various features in determining accuracy,
• Constructs classification models for differentiating between accurate and inac-
curate threads in Twitter, and
• Transfers accuracy classification models between data sets to compare journal-
derived accuracy labels to crowdsourced accuracy labels.
6.1 Data Set Descriptions
Recent interest in rumor, accuracy, and credibility in social media has yielded the
two aforementioned data sets, PHEME and CREDBANK. While both data sets
provide accuracy annotations in Twitter, their constructions differ substantially.
6.1.1 The PHEME Rumor Data Set
The PHEME rumor scheme data set was developed by the University of Warwick in
conjunction with Swissinfo, part of the Swiss Broadcasting Company [100]. Swiss-
info journalists, working with researchers from Warwick, constructed the PHEME
data set by following a set of major events on Twitter and identifying threads of con-
versation that were likely to contain or generate rumors. A “rumor” in this context
was defined as an unverified and relevant statement being circulated, and a rumor
could later be confirmed as true, false, or left unconfirmed. Relating “rumor” to this
chapter’s research, an unconfirmed rumor is a statement with unknown accuracy, a
rumor that is later confirmed to be true is accurate, and a rumor later confirmed as
false is inaccurate.
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PHEME’s events included the social unrest in Ferguson, MO in 2014 following
the shooting of Michael Brown, the Ottawa shooting in Canada in October 2014,
the 2014 Sydney hostage crisis and Charlie Hebdo attacks (mentioned in Chapter 3),
and the Germanwings plane crash. The data set also contained conversations around
four known rumors: conversations about a footballer, Michael Essien, possibly con-
tracting ebola (later confirmed as false); a rumored secret concert performance in
Toronto, Canada (later confirmed as false); a rumor about a museum in Bern, Ger-
many accepting a Nazi-era art collection (later confirmed as true); and rumors about
Russian president Vladimir Putin going missing in March 2015 (later confirmed as
false).
During each of these events, journalists selected popular (i.e., highly retweeted)
tweets extracted from Twitter’s search API and labeled these tweets as rumor or
non-rumor. This construction resulted in a set of 493 labeled rumorous source
tweets. For each tweet in this labeled set, the authors then extracted follow-up tweets
that replied to the source tweet and recursively collected descendant tweets that
responded to these replies. This collection resulted in a tree-like set of conversation
threads of 4,512 additional descendant tweets. In total, the currently available
version of PHEME contains 4,842 tweets.
The Swissinfo journalists labeled source tweets for each of these threads as
true or false. Once this curated set of labeled source tweets and their respective
conversation threads were collected, the PHEME data set was then made available
to crowdsourced annotators to identify characteristics of these conversation threads.
This crowdsourced annotation task asked annotators to identify levels of support
106
(does a tweet support, refute, ask for more information about, or comment on the
source tweet), certainty (tweet author’s degree of confidence in his/her support),
and evidentiality (what sort of evidence does the tweet provide in supporting or
refuting the source tweet) for each tweet in the conversation.
PHEME crowdsourcing results showed annotators were skewed towards la-
beling authors as certain, tweets lacking evidence, and tweets being classified as
comments. Since commentary tweets neither support nor refute the veracity of the
source tweet, these results demonstrate annotators see the majority of tweets as un-
informative with respect to the thread’s truth. The PHEME authors suggest these
results justify altering the annotation scheme and removing the certainty feature
from tweets labeled as comments since certainty is ill-defined for opinion or remark.
6.1.2 The CREDBANK Data Set
In 2015, Mitra and Gilbert introduced CREDBANK, a large-scale crowdsourced
data set of approximately 60 million tweets, 37 million of which were unique. The
data set covered 96 days starting in October of 2014, broken down into over 1,000
sets of event-related tweets, with each event assessed for accuracy by 30 annotators
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) [97]. At a high level, CREDBANK was
created by collecting tweets from Twitter’s public sample stream, identifying topics
within these tweets, and using human annotators to determine which topics were
about events and which of these events contained accurate content. Then, the
authors used Twitter’s search API to expand the set of tweets for each event.
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CREDBANK’s initial set of tweets from the 96-day capture period contained
approximately one billion tweets that were then filtered for spam and grouped into
one-million-tweet windows. Mitra and Gilbert used online LDA from Lau et al.
[101] to extract 50 topics (a topic here is a set of three tokens) from each window,
creating a set of 46,850 candidate event-topic streams. Each potential event-topic
was then passed to 100 annotators on AMT and labeled as an event or non-event,
yielding 1,049 event-related topics (the current version of CREDBANK contains
1,377 events). These event-topics were then sent to 30 AMT users to determine the
event-topic’s accuracy.
This accuracy annotation task instructed users to assess “the credibility level
of the Event” by reviewing tweets returned from searching for the event’s keywords
on Twitter’s website (see Figure 5 in Mitra and Gilbert [97]). After reviewing
the relevant tweets, annotators were asked to provide an accuracy rating on a 5-
point Likert scale of “factuality” (adapted from Sauri et al. [102]) from [−2,+2],
where −2 represented “Certainly Inaccurate” and +2 was “Certainly Accurate” [97].
Annotators were required to provide a justification for their choice as well. This task
appeared difficult for annotators, however, with justifications for lower accuracy
ratings of events related to the State of the Union included, “Some rhetoric, not
necessarily factual,” and, “A lot of conflicting sentiment about state of the union.”
These comments indicated annotators were conflating accuracy of the event with
accuracy of the content.
Once these tweets, topics, event annotations, and accuracy annotations were
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collected, Mitra and Gilbert published this data as the CREDBANK data set.1 Data
provided in CREDBANK includes the three-word topics extracted from Twitter’s
samples stream, each topic’s event annotations, the resulting set of event-topics, a
mapping of event-topics relevant tweets, and a list of the AMT accuracy annotations
for each event-topic (one should note CREDBANK contains no labels of whether
an event is accurate or not).
Mitra and Gilbert then turned to analyzing accuracy annotations and found
the vast majority (> 95%) of events had a simple majority rating of “Certainly
Accurate” [97]. In fact, only a single event had a majority label of inaccurate: the
rumored death of Chris Callahan, the kicker from Baylor University’s football team,
during the 2015 Cotton Bowl (this rumorous event was clearly false as Callahan was
tweeting about his supposed death after the game). After presenting this tendency
towards high ratings, Mitra and Gilbert explored raising the threshold for majority
agreement and found that 76.54% of events had more than 70% agreement, and 2%
of events had 100% agreement among annotators. The authors then chose the 70%
majority-agreement value as their threshold, and the 23% of events in which less
than 70% of annotators agreed were “not perceived to be credible” [97]. While Mitra
and Gilbert did not explicitly define “credibility” in the CREDBANK paper, this
tendency toward high accuracy ratings and the potential confusion between event
accuracy and content accuracy discussed above suggests this metric is measuring
human annotations about credibility.
PHEME’s skewed results may shed light on this annotator bias in CRED-
1Available online http://compsocial.github.io/CREDBANK-data/
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BANK. Since CREDBANK did not identify subjective content in its accuracy an-
notation scheme, annotators might have been biased by the majority of commentary
in the topic threads they were asked to annotate. Taken together, however, these
two data sets provide a resource for analyzing conversational and social networking
aspects of rumor propagation in Twitter.
6.1.2.1 Twitter Data Acquisition
While CREDBANK is publicly available, to conform to Twitter’s terms of service,
the authors are not allowed to share Twitter content directly. Instead, CREDBANK
contains a unique identifier for each tweet in the data set (this ID is provided
by Twitter), and users of CREDBANK can “rehydrate” this tweet content using
Twitter’s APIs. The CREDBANK set contains 37 million of these unique tweet
IDs.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the University of Maryland maintains a set of
tweets gathered from Twitter’s 1% public sample stream from 1 April 2013 to 31
December 2015. This set contains the tweets captured in the first stage of CRED-
BANK’s construction (research has shown tweets captured from the 1% stream are
consistent across users and geographic locations [92]). The intersection between
the University of Maryland’s data set and CREDBANK contains 371,610 tweets to
analyze, or about 1% of the tweets in CREDBANK, which is consistent with the
accuracy analysis performed on the Twitter 1% sample stream.
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6.1.2.2 Labeling CREDBANK Topics
In their published forms, one cannot compare CREDBANK and PHEME directly.
While PHEME contains truth labels for each rumorous thread, CREDBANK con-
tains only the collection of annotator accuracy labels. Given the limited number
of events with majority labels of “inaccurate,” annotator bias towards labels of
high accuracy, and previous research showing Twitter contained more inaccurate
information than this small percentage [8, 99, 103–105], a labeling approach that
could address bias and account for events with conflicting ratings like those about
President Obama’s State of the Union address is required.
A natural extension of these ratings was to analyze the average accuracy rat-
ings for each event and use this average as a proxy for overall accuracy. This
aggregation captures the spread of accuracy ratings better than Mitra and Gilbert’s
agreement and allowed for bias correction.
Across all of CREDBANK, the global average accuracy rating was 1.7 (σ =
0.25), and a single event’s average could be compared to this global average to
determine relative quality. While many events had aggregate ratings close to the
global average, a nearly balanced set of credible and non-credible events was con-
structed by leveraging the global rating’s standard deviation. Specifically, any event
whose average accuracy rating exceeded the global by at least one standard devi-
ation (≥ 1.95) was labeled as credible, and any event with an accuracy rating less
than two standard deviations from the global (≤ 1.4) was labeled as non-credible.
Events between these values were indeterminate and left unlabeled. This method
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resulted in 99 credible events and 67 non-credible events2.
6.2 Accuracy Features
This chapter’s stated goal is to develop models for evaluating accuracy in social me-
dia streams. These models are built on a collection of features, which can be classi-
fied into three types: structural features, user-based features, and content-based fea-
tures. Structural features capture Twitter-specific properties of the tweet stream, in-
cluding tweet volume and activity distributions (e.g., proportions of retweets or me-
dia shares). User features capture properties of users posting about a specific topic;
such properties include interaction graphs, account age, friend/follower counts, and
Twitter verified status. Lastly, content features express components of the text in
tweets about a given topic, like subjectivity and agreement.
6.2.1 Structural Features
Structural features are specific to each Twitter conversation thread. For PHEME,
these features are calculated for each source tweet’s conversation thread, while fea-
tures for CREDBANK are generated across a topic’s conversation (the set of tweets
relevant to that conversation as determined by LDA). Each of these features are
calculated across the entire conversation thread. The first set of structural features
cover frequencies of different tweet types (one should note a given tweet can have
multiple types):
2This augmented set of credible/non-credible events is available at https://github.com/
cbuntain/CREDBANK-data.
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• Tweet Frequency: count of tweets posted in this conversation,
• Hashtag Frequency: count of tweets posted in this conversation that contain
hashtags,
• Media Share Frequency: count of tweets posted in this conversation that
contain media elements,
• Mention Frequency: count of tweets posted in this conversation that con-
tain mentions of other users,
• Retweet Frequency: count of retweets posted in this conversation, and
• Web Link Frequency: count of tweets posted in this conversation that
include a link to another webpage.
For each feature based on a specific type of tweet (e.g., tweet containing hash-
tags or mentions), the structural feature set also includes proportions of tweet types:
• Hashtag Proportion: proportion of tweets that contain hashtags,
• Media Share Proportion: proportion of tweets that contain media ele-
ments,
• Mention Proportion: proportion of tweets that contain mentions of other
users,
• Retweet Proportion: proportion of retweets posted in this conversation,
and
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• Web Link Proportion: proportion of tweets that include a link to another
webpage.
The final structure captures the longevity of a conversation thread on Twitter:
• Thread Lifetime: the number of minutes between the first and last tweets
in the conversation.
6.2.2 User Features
While the previous set of features focus on conversation characteristics, the following
features represent attributes of the users taking part in the conversations. Unlike the
previous features, these features are calculated at each time step in the conversation’s
Twitter stream, where a time step is one minute in duration, and time steps in
which no activity occurs are discarded. These features capture the connectedness
of these users and the density of interaction between these users. The first few user
features analyze account age and reputation (as proxied by followers and friends),
intuition suggesting that younger accounts or accounts with fewer followers have
less reputation to lose by propagating non-credible information, so events with more
content from these accounts might be less credible.
• Account Age: the average age of a user’s account (in minutes) with respect
to Twitter’s first day of use (20 March 2006), and
• Age Difference Between Tweet and Account: time (in minutes) between
when a tweet was posted and when the user posting it created her account
(this feature is based on spam accounts that are created to post a tweet),
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• Follower Count: the average number of users’ followers in a conversation,
• Friend Count: the average number of friends users have in a conversation,
• Verified Accounts: the total number of tweets posted by “verified”3 users
in a conversation,
• Status Count: the average number of statuses posted by users in a conver-
sation, and
• Interaction Network Density: the density of the interaction graph com-
prised of users taking part in the conversation.
This last user-centric feature, network density, is measured by first creating
a graph representation of interactions between a conversation’s constituent users.
Nodes in this graph represent users, and edges correspond to mentions and retweets
between these users, the intuition being that highly dense networks of users are
responding to each other’s posts, whereas sparser interaction graphs suggest the
conversation’s topic is stimulated by influences outside the social network.
6.2.3 Content Features
Content features are similar to user features in that they are calculated for each
time step but differ in that they leverage tweet text to determine user response to
their conversation threads.
3Twitter provides a service called “Verification” for celebrities and organizations to ensure the
accounts are operated by legitimate spokespeople. These verified accounts have badges denoting
their status.
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• Polarity: the average positive or negative feelings expressed in tweet content
up to the current time step, ranged from [−1,+1] for very negative (−1) to
neutral (0) to very positive (+1),
• Subjectivity: the average score on a spectrum [0,+1] between objective (0)
and subjective (1) tweet content, and
• Disagreement: the amount of tweets expressing disagreement with the con-
versation.
Polarity and subjectivity are features derived from a lexicon built by De Smedt
and Daelemans, in which each word is tagged with a part of speech, polarity, sen-
timent, intensity, and other characteristics [106, 107]. To analyze a given tweet for
polarity and subjectivity, the tweet is analyzed to identify sentence boundaries using
punctuation, and each sentence is parsed to generate part-of-speech tags for each
token in the sentence. These part-of-speech tags then identify the token’s sense,
which provides an index into the sentiment analysis lexicon. If the token and its
associated sense are present in the lexicon, the token’s polarity and subjectivity are
added to a running sum for that tweet. The tweet’s overall polarity and subjectivity
are determined by the average values for the tokens that appear in the sentiment
lexicon.
As mentioned in PHEME’s description, tweet annotations include whether
a tweet supports, refutes, comments on, or asks for information about the story
presented in the source tweet. These annotations directly support evaluating the
hypothesis put forth in Mendoza, Poblete, and Castillo [66], stating that rumors
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contain higher proportions of contradiction or refuting messages. CREDBANK,
however, lacks these support annotations for individual tweets.
6.2.3.1 Automatically Classifying Disagreement
To address the absent support labels in CREDBANK, a classifier for differentiating
between tweets that express disagreement from tweets that express agreement was
developed using the support labels in PHEME as ground truth. This classifier used a
pipeline for converting tweet text into TF-IDF vectors, tweets with PHEME support
labels of “disagree” were added to the positive class, and tweets with support of
“agree” were added to the negative class. This data set contained 664 samples of
agreeing tweets and 347 disagreeing tweets. A naive Bayes classifier trained on a
10-fold cross validation set of this data performed marginally well, achieving a mean
AUC for the ROC curve of 0.7266. A version of this classifier trained on all the data
was then stored and applied to the CREDBANK data set to assign disagreement
labels for each tweet. While human annotators would be better for this task, an
automated classifier was preferable given CREDBANK’s size.
6.3 Sampling Methods
As mentioned, PHEME’s and CREDBANK’s construction processes differ signifi-
cantly, which leads to differences in how tweets are sampled from these data sets.
In PHEME, journalists identified a set of highly shared (i.e., retweeted) tweets as
the roots of rumorous conversations and sampled tweets that replied to these roots
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to build threads. CREDBANK identified triples of event-related topical keywords
and used these keywords as search terms in Twitter’s search API to extract a large
portion of relevant tweets. As discussed in the tweet acquisition section above,
however, owing to limitations in Twitter’s historical search API and the data sets
available, this research leverages a 1% random sample of these relevant tweet sets.
It is important to note that these fundamental differences in construction may hin-
der comparative analysis, as will be discussed below. Similarly, the methods for
identifying topics for which to extract tweets used in PHEME (journalist-identified)
and CREDBANK (Twitter-data-driven) may also interfere with analysis.
Beyond sampling topics and tweets, this work also requires a process for sam-
pling accurate and inaccurate conversations/topics to build distributions that can be
compared. For each conversation, each of the aforementioned features are evaluated
at each time step, and the feature’s median value across all time steps is used as that
conversation’s sampled observation for that feature (to ensure resilience against out-
liers). This set of median values across all true and false conversations then comprise
the distributions for each feature. Therefore, even though the parent distributions
for each feature may not be normally distributed (as one would expect for skewed
events like retweets), these sample distributions for the medians are approximately
normal. One could develop a more sophisticated sampling process that instead uses
characteristics of the underlying data generating processes for each feature, but cal-
culating median values is computationally less expensive, which is important given
the motivation for rapid assessment here.
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6.4 Feature Analysis
The previous section presents a feature collection covering a variety of structures
and behaviors in rumorous conversation threads on Twitter. While intuition sug-
gests each feature may be useful in assessing accuracy, these features likely differ in
importance for this task. The following section evaluates each feature’s predictive
power across three studies: comparing feature distributions to determine whether a
feature differs significantly between accurate and inaccurate conversations, leverag-
ing ensembles of tree-based learning algorithms to evaluate Gini importance [108],
and performing ablation studies to find an optimal feature set. These evaluations
are performed on the PHEME data set since its evaluations are backed by input
from journalists rather than crowd-sourced and inferred labels.
6.4.1 Statistical Differences
This first study compared feature values from the sample of credible conversation
threads to those of the non-credible threads using a two-tailed Welch’s t-test. A
two-tailed Welch’s t-test assuming heteroskedasticity is appropriate here given the
sample distributions over the medians should be normally distributed. Furthermore,
to address issues of multiple comparison and correct for the experimentwise error
rate, a Bonferroni correction is used. Therefore, for the experimentwise significant
level α = 0.05 and k = 22 features to test, a feature is said to be significantly
different if p ≤ αB = 0.05/22 = 0.002272.
For features calculated across time steps (e.g., polarity or network density), the
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cumulative values from the final time step were used. For example, if a conversation
thread covered sixty minutes, this test would use the feature’s value at the sixtieth
minute. Since these time-dependent features were constructed using running sums,
this construct equated to evaluating features over the entire conversation, thereby
removing temporal dependency. Results from these studies are shown in Table 6.1.
These results show only one feature is significantly different between the two
classes after applying the Bonferroni correction: the conversation thread’s lifetime
(or length in minutes). Disagreement and the number of verified accounts are close
but are not significantly different after applying the Bonferroni correction.
6.4.2 Gini-based Feature Importance
Analyzing statistical differences in features shows differences between credible and
non-credible conversation threads but does not directly estimate which features were
most useful for delineating between credible and non-credible threads. Many tree-
based classifiers estimate this utility when determining features on which to split.
One method for calculating this utility uses the Gini Importance measure, also
called the mean decrease in impurity, which is a measure of the number of samples
a given feature separates across all nodes in the tree that use this feature. Higher
Gini Importance values for a given feature show the feature reduces impurity (i.e.,
mismatched labels) in a subset more than features with lower Gini Importance
values. Gini Importance is also well-suited for ensembles of trees by averaging a
feature’s Gini Impurity across all trees in the ensemble.
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Tweet Frequency 226.3041 181.5535 1.3913 0.1651
Retweet Frequency 211.7193 163.2642 1.5342 0.1259
Web Link Frequency 108.4094 73.5786 1.6576 0.0984
Media Frequency 84.4737 71.1635 0.6092 0.5428
Hashtag Frequency 134.5439 119.6164 0.5187 0.6043
Mention Frequency 225.3041 180.4591 1.3945 0.1641
Retweet Proportion 0.8504 0.8048 2.1345 0.0335
Web Link Proportion 0.4957 0.3787 2.3949 0.0172
Media Shares Proportion 0.3588 0.3171 0.8652 0.3876
Hashtag Proportion 0.5636 0.6066 -0.9165 0.3601
Mention Proportion 0.9834 0.9859 -0.7021 0.4831
Thread Lifetime 1,367 2,683 -3.7971 0.0002
Account Age 2,789,885 2,769,758 0.5633 0.5736
Tweet-Age Difference 1,832,055 1,790,337 1.2481 0.2129
Follower Count 18,184.42 18,826.63 -0.1488 0.8818
Friend Count 1,043.50 1,023.51 0.3231 0.7468
Verified Accounts 5.7251 3.327 3.0006 0.0029
Status Count 22,522 23,502 -0.878 0.3806
Network Density 0.0406 0.0412 -0.0719 0.9427
Polarity 0.0232 0.004 0.9843 0.3257
Subjectivity 0.2279 0.2471 -0.6879 0.492
Disagreement 0.0065 0.0153 -2.9922 0.003
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This study made use of a random forest classifier with 100 trees and calculated
the Gini Importance for each feature, as shown in Table 6.2, which is sorted in order
of decreasing importance.
As with statistical difference results, thread lifetime is the most important
feature. The majority of remaining features cluster around the average, with the
frequency-based features tending to be the least important.



















Figure 6.1: Gini Importance Values
6.4.3 Feature Ablation
The final study on feature analysis constructs a classifier from all features, evaluates
that classifier’s performance, then iteratively removes features. The classifier cre-
ated at each iteration is also evaluated, and its performance is compared against the
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Table 6.2: Gini Importance Across Features (ordered by decreasing importance)
Feature Index Feature Gini Importance
21 Thread Lifetime 0.0781
20 Disagreement 0.0659
19 Follower Count 0.0563
18 Polarity 0.0534
17 Account Age 0.0513
16 Subjectivity 0.0501
15 Tweet-Age Difference 0.0499
14 Retweet Proportion 0.0488
13 Friend Count 0.0488
12 Status Count 0.0479
11 Hashtag Proportion 0.0459
10 Verified Accounts 0.0454
9 Web Link Proportion 0.0446
8 Mention Frequency 0.0427
7 Retweet Frequency 0.0395
6 Tweet Frequency 0.0388
5 Mention Proportion 0.0387
4 Network Density 0.0356
3 Hashtag Frequency 0.0336
2 Web Link Frequency 0.0331
1 Media Proportion 0.0307
0 Media Frequency 0.0208
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original classifier. This method demonstrates which features improve versus hinder
performance: Removing (or ablating) important features will result in a large de-
crease in performance, and removing unimportant or bad features will either increase
performance or have little impact.
Classifiers used in this study consisted of extra-tree classifiers using 100 estima-
tors, and they were evaluated by the mean ROC-AUC over a 10-fold cross validation
set. Each feature estimate was performed twenty times with random permutations
of the data set to reduce variance in scores. Feature ablation results are shown in
Table 6.3.
Thread lifetime, author follower count, disagreement, and proportion of men-
tions contributed the most to the classifier performance (as their removal results in
the largest drops in performance). The performance impact after removing the men-
tion proportions feature was steeper than between removing any other two features,
so the first four features appeared the most important.
As a follow-up to these results and to determine the minimum number of
features necessary, an additional recursive feature elimination experiment was per-
formed. This study removed the least contributing feature iteratively, re-running
a round of ablation with the remaining features until a single feature remained.
The resulting curve of ROC-AUC scores then showed a maximum score for the ideal
number of features. Determining which feature to remove used the same ROC-AUC,
10-fold cross-validation method as above. The list of removed features is shown in
Table 6.4, with the resulting score curves shown in Figure 6.2.
These results show the best-performing classifier included about half of the
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Table 6.3: Feature Ablation Results
Feature Set ROC-AUC Difference
All Features 68.91% –
Without Thread Lifetime 66.30% -2.61%
Without Follower Count 67.12% -1.79%
Without Disagreement 67.14% -1.77%
Without Mention Proportion 67.24% -1.67%
Without Verified Accounts 67.69% -1.22%
Without Tweet Frequency 67.69% -1.21%
Without Mention Frequency 67.71% -1.19%
Without Subjectivity 67.72% -1.19%
Without Web Link Proportion 67.74% -1.16%
Without Web Link Frequency 67.86% -1.05%
Without Account Ages 67.89% -1.02%
Without Polarity 67.99% -0.92%
Without Friend Count 68.06% -0.85%
Without Media Frequency 68.11% -0.80%
Without Media Proportion 68.14% -0.77%
Without Status Count 68.21% -0.70%
Without Retweet Proportion 68.25% -0.66%
Without Hashtag Frequency 68.25% -0.66%
Without Tweet-Age Difference 68.28% -0.63%
Without Hashtag Proportion 68.29% -0.62%
Without Retweet Frequency 68.39% -0.52%
Without Network Density 68.56% -0.35%
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Table 6.4: Recursive Feature Eilimination Results (∗ denotes maximum)
Features Removed Removed Feature ROC-AUC
0 – 68.91%
1 Network Density 68.56%
2 Tweet-Age Difference 68.83%
3 Polarity 69.07%
4 Media Proportion 69.30%
5 Friend Count 69.17%
6 Web Link Proportion 68.97%
7 Retweet Proportion 69.21%
8 Verified Accounts 69.37%
9 Status Frequency 69.21%
10 Media Frequency 69.32%
11 Hashtag Frequency 70.09%
12 Retweet Frequency 70.23%
13 Tweet Frequency 70.02%
14 Mention Proportion 69.96%
15 Account Ages 69.43%
16 Hashtag Proportion 68.76%
17 Disagreement 67.81%
18 Follower Count 66.53%
19 Subjectivity 65.03%
20 Mention Frequency 60.43%
21 Thread Lifetime 58.55%
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Figure 6.2: Recursive Feature Elimination Results
features: web link frequency, thread lifetime, mention frequency, subjectivity, author
follower count, disagreement, hashtag proportion, account age, mention proportion,
and tweet frequency. Including thread lifetime and disagreement was consistent with
other feature analysis results.
6.5 Models of Accuracy
Feature analysis results show the best-performing RF classifier for PHEME uses ten
features and achieves an ROC-AUC score of 70.23%. This section takes this classifier
and feature set as the baselines for exploring accuracy models in PHEME. Part of
this study focuses on evaluating minimum observation times necessary to achieve
this performance (i.e., how long must a conversation thread be observed before a
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sufficiently accurate evaluation can be made). Then, these models are applied to
the CREDBANK data set to determine how well these accuracy models transfer to
crowdsourced assessments.
6.5.1 Accuracy in PHEME
The previous feature analysis section shows which features contribute to accuracy
but not how those features are combined to determine accuracy. While non-linear
SVMs, random forests, deep neural networks, and other classification models can
achieve high accuracy, they do not lend themselves to explaining how that accu-
racy was achieved in an understandable or intuitive manner. Explainability is an
important characteristic for journalist support tools, as users are less likely to trust
a simple black box system.
To address this issue, a linear SVM model was trained on all the PHEME
data using the ten most predictive features from the previous section. These fea-
tures’ coefficients were then extracted from the model to give insight into how these
features interact. These weights denote how much each feature contributed to the
overall classification, with positive weights pushing the label towards credible, and
negative weights pushing the label towards non-credible. These results are shown
in Table 6.5.
These results show thread lifetime has the strongest effect on accuracy with
the largest absolute weight; the conversation thread’s lifetime is also highly nega-
tive, which one can interpret as the longer the conversation takes, the more likely
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Web Link Frequency 0.7631
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it is to be non-credible. This result is consistent with the statistical analysis for
thread lifetime shown above, in which the average accurate conversation persisted
for about half as long as the average inaccurate thread. Similarly, the amount of
disagreement present in a conversation is also strongly indicative of a inaccurate
topic, with disagreement having the second largest weight magnitude and a highly
negative weight as well. Inaccurate threads having higher amounts of disagreement
is intuitive and also consistent with the statistical differences shown above and the
hypothesis put forth by Mendoza, Poblete, and Castillo [66].
While the remaining weights are weaker, a few observations are interesting:
The overall number of mentions present in a conversation indicates the conversation
should be accurate, but the proportion of mentions suggests the conversation should
be inaccurate. Though this result seems paradoxical, when taken with the tweet
frequency feature, it suggests that having many tweets with fewer mentions indicates
accurate conversation. Author account age and and frequency of web links are also
intuitive in that conversations in which older accounts participate and have more
instances of links to third-party content suggest more accurate content. Surprisingly,
the more followers the average conversation participant has, however, the less likely a
topic is to be accurate, though this feature has one of the weakest weights. Lastly, the
subjectivity feature has a weakly negative weight, which one might expect given that
higher values for the subjectivity feature denote users are posting more subjective
content.
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6.5.1.1 Minimum Observation Times
Another important factor about credibility is the amount of observation time nec-
essary before a accuracy assessment can be made. While one could expect a high-
quality accuracy assessment after several days of observing a conversation thread,
such an assessment is of limited utility for first responders or decision makers who
need to take action rapidly.
To determine the effect observation duration has on model performance, an
experiment was developed in which the observation time (in minutes) began two
minutes into each conversation and iteratively increased by five-minute intervals to
four hours. Thread lifetime was modified for this experiment to return the minimum
between the full thread’s length and the current observation interval. For each
observation duration, an RF model was trained only on data during that duration,
and the resulting model was scored using 10-fold cross validation as before. Results
are shown in Figure 6.3.
Within the first few minutes, classifier performance is slightly better than
random, but after observing approximately twenty minutes of the conversation,
the model’s score increases significantly. After twenty minutes, the score decreases
and slowly climbs back up to its maximum slightly more than two hours into the
conversation.
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Figure 6.3: Model Scores Across Observation Times
6.5.2 Transferring PHEME Models to CREDBANK
Having explored accuracy and its features in the PHEME data set, the next question
concerns how well these models perform on crowdsourced. To answer this question,
two RF models were trained on the PHEME data and applied to CREDBANK: the
best-performing model from the PHEME data set, a 100-estimator RF trained with
the best ten features, and an additional model using all possible features. These
models were then evaluated by ROC-AUC according to the inferred labels discussed
above. Results for these models are shown in Figure 6.4.
PHEME’s models performed no better than random guessing for CRED-
BANK’s inferred accuracy labels, with the model using all features performing
132




















Top Ten Features (AUC=45.45%)
All Features (AUC=48.42%)
Random (AUC=50.00%)
Figure 6.4: Transferring Accuracy Models to CREDBANK
slightly better than the top-ten-feature model. To determine whether this poor per-
formance stems from the accuracy labeling inference used in CREDBANK, these
two models were also used to rank the CREDBANK topics based on label proba-
bility (i.e., the probability that a given topic was credible), and this ranking was
compared to the ranking induced by taking the average annotator accuracy rating
for each topic. p−Values were then calculated using Kendall’s τ to measure cor-
relation between these two rankings: The top-ten model had p = 0.4273, and the
all-feature model model had p = 0.9511, meaning neither model had a significant
correlation with the annotator-based rankings.
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6.5.3 Accuracy in CREDBANK
With the PHEME models’ poor performance in CREDBANK, an open question
was whether accuracy in CREDBANK could be assessed automatically. Since all
the same features were already calculated for the labeled CREDBANK topics, a
new model was trained directly on CREDBANK and evaluated using 10-fold cross-
validation. This new model (shown in Figure 6.5) performed much better than the
transferred models, with a ROC-AUC score of nearly 92%, suggesting that the ac-
curacy annotations provided by CREDBANK’s crowd source users differed in some
fundamental way from the truth labels journalists provided in PHEME. This differ-
ence was further confirmed by an analysis of feature importance in CREDBANK,
shown in Table 6.6, where large numbers of web links, media, and verified accounts
have the highest scores.
6.6 Observations on Accuracy and Credibility
Investigations into automatically assessing accuracy in PHEME suggest first that
the duration of a conversation and the amount of disagreement present within that
conversation are the two most important features. While several other features (pri-
marily author follower count and mentions) also contribute to accuracy in PHEME,
disagreement and thread lifetime are always near the top in each feature analysis
test. Social network-based and structural features (e.g., network density, partic-
ipating verified accounts, hashtag usage, etc.) are less important in PHEME. In
contrast, frequency of web links, media, and verified accounts are some of the most
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Table 6.6: Gini Importance in CREDBANK (ordered by decreasing importance)
Feature Index Feature Gini Importance
21 Web Link Frequency 0.1141
20 Media Frequency 0.0814
19 Media Proportion 0.0735
18 Verified Accounts 0.0734
17 Web Link Proportion 0.0529
16 Hashtag Frequency 0.0482
15 Tweet Frequency 0.0476
14 Tweet-Age Difference 0.0420
13 Mention Frequency 0.0414
12 Retweet Proportion 0.0402
11 Retweet Frequency 0.0401
10 Thread Lifetime 0.0388
9 Hashtag Proportion 0.0363
8 Account Ages 0.0357
7 Follower Count 0.0354
6 Mention Proportion 0.0354
5 Friend Count 0.0342
4 Status Count 0.0307



























Figure 6.5: Accuracy Models to CREDBANK
important features of accuracy in CREDBANK.
Diverging feature importance between PHEME and CREDBANK suggest the
aspects of accuracy addressed in the two data sets are fundamentally different.
While PHEME captures accuracy in an objective fashion as determined by jour-
nalists, CREDBANK captures the perception of accuracy (or how believable are
tweets about a given topic) as determined by crowdsourced workers. This differ-
ence highlights the distinction between accuracy and credibility discussed at the
beginning of this chapter: Relying on journalists to assess accuracy in social media
measures veracity and objective truth, whereas relying on crowdsourced assessments
in CREDBANK instead measure whether a topic is believable, or credible, and these
two measures do not necessarily imply the other. Given the nuanced differences be-
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tween truth and believability, future research could explore these factors and how
different patterns of communication in social media influence them.
CREDBANK’s orientation towards perceptions of accuracy could explain the
importance of “off-site support” in accurate events, where “off-site support” refers
to links to content outside of the Twitter network, like webpages and media. Since
frequency and proportion of media posts are positively correlated to labels of ac-
curacy in CREDBANK, exposure to other sources reinforcing a topic may increase
its believability, or perception of credibility, by providing visual confirmation of the
event [11].
6.6.1 Limitations and Future Work
A main limitation of this work is in the differences between PHEME and CRED-
BANK, both in their construction and the different events and timeframes they
cover. First, PHEME is based on tree-like threads of conversation, starting with a
highly-retweeted source tweet and analyzing replies to that tweet. CREDBANK,
on the other hand, is less structured, with tweets grouped by topic similarity, which
obfuscates the threaded structure present in PHEME. This difference may explain
why conversation lifetime is more important in PHEME than in CREDBANK. In
PHEME, the majority of tweets in accurate threads happen early in the conversa-
tion, with little content posted after the first day, whereas inaccurate threads persist
for nearly twice as long. This bias towards early content for accurate topics is con-
sistent with Zubiaga’s analysis of the average amount of time necessary to resolve
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whether a rumor is true or not: approximately two hours for true rumors and fifteen
hours for false rumors [100]. CREDBANK, however, shows virtually no difference in
conversation lifetime, which may be an artifact of pre-specified observation periods
used in CREDBANK’s crowdsourcing task. Future work could address this problem
and identify threads of conversation in CREDBANK by identifying highly retweeted
tweets in a topic and extracting replies from the CREDBANK set (if these replies
are present). Extracting these threads from CREDBANK would support a fairer
comparison with PHEME.
Similarly, PHEME’s construction includes annotator-provided labels on whether
a tweet agrees or disagrees with the thread’s topic/originating tweet. Constructing
this feature in CREDBANK relies instead on an automated classifier whose per-
formance could be improved. Disagreement may therefore be more important in
CREDBANK but is masked by errors in classification.
To understand better the connection between journalists’ idea of truth and
users’ perceptions of credibility, one could construct a single data set that covers
the same events and solicits input from both journalists and regular users. A com-
parison between these two sources on the same data might address issues like biases
towards believability or events with differing levels of impact or polarized opinion
(e.g., PHEME’s rumor of a football player contracting ebola versus CREDBANK’s
coverage of President Obama’s State of the Union address in the United States).
Finally, this work does not explore the sources of disagreement in PHEME and
CREDBANK. As a result, the overall contributions of this work must be tempered
by the possibility that the sources of disagreement could be journalists or media
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organizations. If these entities are the ones responsible for sharing disagreement
and attempting to correct the accuracy of stories, then users might be better served
simply by following these journalists or news organizations rather than relying on




This dissertation develops the foundations for automatic, real-time discovery of
high-impact events from social media streams by first analyzing how social me-
dia responds to crises and then developing algorithms for identifying these events.
Responding to the population’s increasing reliance on such social media streams
for breaking news and information, the capstone of this dissertation is an analy-
sis of features the indicate veracity and credibility in these streams. Experiments
presented herein rely on Twitter as a model platform for social networks.
The major contributions of this work are:
• A description of Twitter’s response (and lack thereof) to terrorist attacks in
Western countries,
• The introduction and evaluation of LABurst, an open-domain, language-agnostic
algorithm for detecting high-impact events in social media streams,
• A real-time extension of LABurst, called RTTBurst, that uses distributed
processing platforms to discover and summarize high-impact events and topics,
and
• An analysis of the features that can predict credibility and veracity in Twitter
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streams.
Before developing algorithms for detecting high-impact events from social me-
dia, one must first understand how social media platforms respond to these events.
Chapter 3 illuminates these predictable responses in Twitter with an analysis of
terrorist attacks in a Western countries. This analysis shows crisis-level events like
acts of terrorism do not drive message or user volume on Twitter. Rather, crises
alter Twitter’s topic distribution, with content relevant to the attack experiencing
significant but short-lived bursts in volume. Furthermore, retweets and hashtags
also experience these significant and short bursts, with volumes of relevant tweets,
retweets, and hashtags returning to pre-event levels within a few days. Frequency of
users sharing links to web pages about the attacks increases more slowly and remains
high several days after an attack. Finally, Twitter users tend to prefer sharing con-
tent about attacks published by local authorities or local news organizations, with
these entities experiencing significant increases in followers.
After demonstrating that one cannot rely on overall Twitter dynamics to in-
dicate major events, Chapter 4 introduces LABurst, an open-domain, language-
agnostic algorithm for tracking bursts in individual keywords. Several features are
presented and evaluated that capture rapid increases in token usage, with a simple
exponential curve-fitting feature being the most indicative. LABurst is also com-
pared against a pair of baselines to show token-based burst detection performs com-
parably with domain-specific techniques without requiring domain-specific knowl-
edge. Chapter 4 then closes with a demonstration of LABurst’s domain agnosticism
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by showing how models trained on sporting events can be directly applied to earth-
quake detection.
Chapter 5 extends this event discovery algorithm to the real-time streaming
context, thereby establishing event-related topics can be tracked and summarized
as they occur. RTTBurst, the real-time extension of LABurst, uses a modern dis-
tributed processing framework to identify high-impact events in user-provided top-
ics and performs competitively with similar real-time tracking systems, as shown
by RTTBurst’s high placement in an independently evaluated competition run by
NIST. Post hoc analysis from NIST’s TREC Microblog tasks further demonstrate
that real-time burst detection models can be integrated into classical information
retrieval systems to increase performance in real-time summarization tasks for social
media streams.
These first few chapters establish the framework for real-time, open-domain
event discovery in social media. Can information about these events be trusted
though? Chapter 6 explores the features that indicate credibility in social media by
analyzing a pair of Twitter-based credibility data sets: the PHEME rumor scheme,
and CREDBANK. These two sets exhibit differing definitions of credibility: either as
veracity or as a perception/belief of truth. Results show veracity in social media can
be determined primarily through conversation length and amount of disagreement,
while perceptions of credibility are more influenced by large amounts of links to
other web pages, retweets, and mentions of other users. To the degree that veracity
can be assessed in social media streams, this assessment can be performed with
between twenty minutes and two hours of observation.
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Chapters 3 and 4 establish feasibility for the event discovery task. Chapter 5
integrates these signals and features into a testable implementation, on which Chap-
ter 6’s credibility model can be applied. Together, these research areas demonstrate
the detection, summarization, and credibility assessment of high-impact events from
social media streams like Twitter.
RTTBurst’s implementation and the credibility features described in Chapter 6
can be extended and enhanced to create an end-to-end system usable by journalists,
first responders, and the general public. This system can address the currently
deficient methods for extracting newsworthy information from social media while
also providing a source for credible information in times of crisis. These contributions
are directly usable in the relatively new fields of computational journalism and crisis
informatics, which seek to improve news gathering and crisis response by leveraging
new technologies and data sources like machine learning and social media.
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